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ABSTRACT
China currently has no in-work benefit nor social welfare programs such as the Earned Income
Tax Credits (EITC) in the United States. Yet, the literature and global evidence have suggested
EITC-type programs’ potentials on poverty alleviation and work incentives. This dissertation ex-
amines the first-ever EITC field experiment series in China with a variety of interventions and
rigorous validation procedures. The experiment series shows that the participation of the program
increases employment and hours worked. It also finds significant increases in household earnings
and expenditures. These effects are substantially larger than the existing literature partially because
of the strong treatment intensity. This dissertation contributes to a large literature that studies the
effect of in-work benefits.
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1. INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW
1.1 Introduction
China currently has no in-work benefits, such as Earned Income Tax Credits (EITC) in the
United States. Yet, the literature and global evidence have suggested EITC-type programs’ sub-
stantial potentials on poverty alleviation and work incentives. This dissertation studies the first-ever
EITC-type experiment series that evaluates its feasibility and effect in China. This section will
introduce a quick overview of the dissertation, including motivation, research question, design,
result, and contribution.
1.1.1 Motivation
One distinguishing fact about China that makes this experiment particularly critical is that
China currently spends very little on social spending (3.05% vs. 12.42% for OECD average1),
particularly on cash transfer programs (0.40% of GDP vs. 3.04% in the US2). All of the cur-
rent welfare programs in China (e.g., Dibao) are means-tested programs. Moreover, China has no
incentive-compatible transfer program, while the US has many. Importantly, the evaluations of
the current means-tested programs in China indicate that their performance is very unsatisfactory
(e.g., Ravallion et al., 2006). An opportunity arises if China can substantially increase cash trans-
fer. Hence, a comprehensive evaluation through experiments to evaluate an EITC-type program-a
1I use public social expenditure (cash and in-kind) in OECD Social Expenditure Database (SOCX) minus pension
to calculate the percentages for OECD countries. China’s percentage is calculated by incorporating all the transfers
that fall in OECD classifications. The data for China is from the National Government Final Accounts (Ministry of
Finance, 2017). OECD’s classification of social expenditure includes old-age, survivors, incapacity-related benefits,
health, family, active labor market programs, unemployment, housing, and expenditures on other social policies. Tax
credits are not included. Please see the OECD SOCX Manual for more information.
2I calculate China’s percentage by incorporating all the cash transfer that are listed in National Government Final
Accounts (Ministry of Finance, 2017). The US’s percentage is calculated by incorporating cash transfer that is listed
in SOCX plus EITC. A program is included if and only if China has one for a similar purpose. Therefore, I am
maximizing the transfers in China while censoring the number for the US. Cash transfers that are considered for China
include Minimum Subsistence (Dibao), incapacity-related cash benefits, Extreme Poverty Allowance, Agricultural
Income Stabilization Subsidy, Grain for Green Cash Subsidy, Catastrophic Supplemental Aid, and other subsistence
aids. Cash transfers that are considered for the US include incapacity-related cash benefits, survivor cash benefits,
other cash benefits (SNAP and other), unemployment cash benefits, family cash benefits (TANF), and Earned Income
Tax Credit (EITC).
1
world-popular incentive-compatible cash transfer program that has long been proven effective and
successful has important policy implications.
1.1.2 Research Question
This dissertation aims to answer the following questions through three field experiments: A)
will EITC policy work in China, i.e., will EITC policy increase the labor supply? B) If the policy
increases the labor supply, will it increase the earning? C) If it increases the earning, will it increase
the expenditure?
1.1.3 Study Design
Between 2014 and 2018, China Household Finance and Survey (CHFS) at Southwestern Uni-
versity of Finance and Economics conducted a series of experiments that aim to test the effects of
an EITC-type policy. Each experiment has a different design and population focus. There are a
total of 1,798 households that participated in the experiments. Households in the treatment group
enrolled an EITC-type program-Labor Income Reward Plan, which is one of the typical in-work
benefits among OECD countries. Upon enrollment, households started receiving cash rewards reg-
ularly. The amount of reward depends on household earning in the last month. The offered EITC
programs contain three stages, including phase-in, plateau, and phase-out3. The amount of reward
will first increase with earning. Then, it reaches the maximum and no longer changes with the
earning (plateau). Eventually, the reward will start decreasing as households earn more and move
into the phase-out stage. Once the earning exceeds the break-even point, the household becomes
ineligible for the program automatically. Enrolled households are required to report their earnings
and employment status every month to get the rewards. Each claim needs supporting materials
such as proof of employment and income (see Appendices). Household surveys were conducted
among households in both the treatment and the control group to track changes such as employ-
ment, hours worked, earning, consumption, and self-reported health conditions. Finally, regression
analysis and distribution analysis are performed to identify the impacts of the EITC programs on a




The designs have two important and unique features that are worth noting. First, the experi-
ments implement a relatively strong treatment intensity compared to the existing studies (3%-7%
of the income). Second, the designs employed a comprehensive measure to audit and validate each
earning claim. Given that China has a large portion (47%4) of self-employed jobs, this validation
process is particularly crucial for the experiments since it is relatively easier for the self-employed
to manipulate earnings compared to the employed with formal contracts.
1.1.4 Main Result
The results show that Labor Income Reward Plan increases labor supply significantly on both
extensive margin and intensive margin. Estimates show that program participation increases the
average number of employed per household and household monthly hours worked. Consequently,
household monthly earning (without the benefit) and monthly expenditure have also increased.
The size of the effects seems to be a lot larger than the existing literature, which is partially due to
the strong treatment intensity.
1.1.5 Contribution
This dissertation primarily contributes to the literature that studies the effects of incentive-
compatible transfer programs using field experiments and non-experimental methods by presenting
the first-ever EITC field experiment series in developing countries with rigorous validation proce-
dures. The dissertation yields important policy implications for governments and policymakers.
The next section will briefly summarize China’s current anti-poverty policies, challenges, and
solutions. Then, it will discuss the Earned Income Tax Credit policy in the United States and
relevant studies. Chapter Two, Chapter Three, and Chapter Four cover three EITC experiments
that are conducted in China, including Wutongqiao Experiment, Mabian/Muchuan Experiment,
and Leibo Experiment. Each of the three chapters will first describe the design of the experiment
and the general implementation procedure. Then, it presents the methodology that is used for
4See The World Bank (2019) for data source.
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analysis and the main results. Next, there will be a section that explores specific parts of the
experiment. The last section will summarize the findings of the experiment. Finally, Chapter Five
concludes.
1.2 Background: China’s War on Poverty and EITC
China’s current objective for anti-poverty policies is to lift all registered poor households and
counties out of poverty and solve the regional poverty problem by 2020. According to the official
agenda, a household is considered as being lifted out of poverty if the household has a stable source
of income, income per capita higher than the national poverty line, does not have food and clothing
issue, and guaranteed access to compulsory education, basic healthcare, and housing safety. The
national poverty line was 2,300 RMB in 2015 when the objective was announced. Estimation
shows that there were 70 million people in China who lived under the national poverty line. The
goal is to lift all of them out of poverty by 2020. In order to do so, the government has released a
poverty alleviation plan for the 13th Five-Year Plan period (2016-2020) that describes the detailed
policies in each sector.
China’s current anti-poverty policies can be categorized as regional and household policies.
According to the official, China has 14 poor areas, 832 poor counties (30% of the total), 148 poor
villages (21% of the total), and 29.5 million registered poor households (7% of the total). These
entities are heavily overlapped with each other. More importantly, household policies only apply
to registered poor households. Other policies are regional, which means they apply to geographical
areas instead of a specific group of people or households.
1.2.1 Regional Policies
Regional policies mainly involve sectors such as industry, employment, education, healthcare,
ecosystem restoration, and infrastructure construction. Policies are largely implemented in forms
of government-oriented construction projects, investments, and subsidies. Industry policies focus
on supporting poor areas to develop agricultural production and tourism. For agricultural produc-
tion, poor villages can apply for subsidies from governments to develop their own unified, large
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scale agricultural production projects that produce local specialty products. For tourism, the gov-
ernment has selected around 6,000 poor villages to make investment and construct infrastructure
to develop tourist sites. Employment policies mainly consist of job training programs that are
subsidized by governments. Education policies focus on supporting kindergarten constructions in
poor areas. Meanwhile, each student in the compulsory education system is provided with a 4
RMB (0.6 USD) food subsidy per day to improve nutrition. For higher education, poor areas can
enjoy exclusive admission quotas among public universities. Healthcare policies focus on sup-
porting hospital constructions in poor areas. Ecosystem restoration mainly involves several large
scale restoration projects. The purpose of the projects is to reverse the degeneration of ecosys-
tems by planting vegetation. In addition, populations that reside in habitat conservation areas will
be moved to other places. Governments will provide cash compensations as well as new houses
and relevant infrastructure constructions. Infrastructure construction largely involves government-
invested projects, including roads, railways, airports, irrigation systems, drinking water systems,
power plants, electricity transmissions, communication networks, farming and public facilities.
Lastly, local governments have invested and installed mini solar power stations and hydroelectric
power stations for households in some areas. By selling unused electricity to the grid companies,
these power stations can generate additional income for the poor households continuously.
1.2.2 Household Policies
Household policies mainly involve sectors such as job training, Minimum Subsistence, house
renovation, moving, healthcare guarantee, and micro-finance discount. Policies are implemented
in forms of privileges. First of all, the government will organize farming technique training pro-
grams so that registered poor households with able-bodied persons are guaranteed to master at least
one useful skill to start farming. Registered poor households can enroll in technical or vocational
schools for free. Meanwhile, registered poor households enjoy scholarships and subsidies for liv-
ing costs while studying in universities. Once graduated, there will be guaranteed employment
arrangements. For education, registered poor households can waive the miscellaneous fees if they
enroll in senior high schools. Some majors at some of the technical schools have exclusive quotas
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specially allocated for the poor households. In addition, poor households are guaranteed scholar-
ships and student loans in universities. For healthcare, governments provide full subsidy to poor
households for health insurance. The households also enjoy lower deductible levels and higher
reimbursement rates as well as a catastrophic disease aid. Lastly, poor households can apply for
small loans without providing securities. Registered poor households can also apply for soft loans
or loans with discounted interest rates.
1.2.3 Inaccurate Identification and Welfare Dependency
Regional policies are made to deal with underdeveloped economies with problems such as lack
of public infrastructure (e.g., education and healthcare facilities), lack of natural resources, and
severely degenerated ecosystems, which are typical among poor areas. However, regional policies
cannot fully accomplish the goal of poverty reduction. First of all, the government’s identification
of poor areas is inaccurate. Wang et al. (2007)’s study shows that, in 2001, about 25% of poor
counties are over-qualified. About 48% of poor villages are not actually the poorest. Even if the
identifications were accurate, regional policies could not fully cover all poverty in the country.
Theoretically, the 14 poor areas and counties can only cover 50% to 60% of the poor population
(Li et al., 2017). This means that almost half of the poor population cannot receive benefits directly
from the regional policies. The policies also have some issues. On the one hand, most regional
policies are implemented in forms of government-oriented construction projects, investments, and
subsidies. Usually, the policies only put restrictions on items such as dates of completion or amount
of investments. Policies do not require reasonable evaluations to investigate the effects on poverty
reduction. Therefore, it is almost impossible to evaluate these policies through quantitative anal-
ysis. On the other hand, almost all of the funds are financed by the government. This makes the
poor areas rely heavily on governments’ aids and lack of motivation to reduce poverty.
Household policies are made to help families recover from the ordeals. Most of the policies
can be characterized as subsistence. Consequently, household policies can only help the poor to
some extent. On top of that, the identification of registered poor households is very inaccurate.
Many poor households are not registered. Wang and Guo (2015) conducted a survey of 1,200
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households. They found that about 40% of the households are over qualified. About 58% eligible
households below the poverty lines are not registered as poor. Moreover, there is almost no policy
that provides households with incentives to increase their incomes. As a result, there has been
almost no increase in income among registered poor households. Thus, the welfare dependency is-
sue arises, and the pressure for the households to return to poverty has been growing. For example,
the Rural Minimum Income Guarantee is a typical cash transfer program that can be applied by
any household that has income below the poverty line. For poor households, an increase in income
means facing a greater risk of losing cash grants. Some poor households refused to be lifted from
poverty deliberately because of this reason. Other households, realizing the loss of the cash grants,
decided to return to poverty and start relying on welfare again. This fact was reflected by the de-
crease in income among the low-income group on the macro-level. From 2013 to 2016, China’s
rural disposable income per capita has been increased by 7% on average every year. However, the
income of the bottom tier has been decreasing. This indicates that the welfare dependency issue
has been a prevalent phenomenon.
1.2.4 Solution: Incentives-compatible Programs
China’s current regional and household anti-poverty policies share two common issues. One
issue is inaccurate identification. The other issue is dependency. The government has been mak-
ing improvements such as using dynamic identification methods to update the poor areas routinely
and putting more restrictions on eligibility for Rural Minimum Income Guarantee. Although these
efforts helped alleviate the problems, they touched a little the fundamental problem of policy rent-
seeking among regions and households. The key to solving the problems once and for all is to
implement an incentives-compatible transfer program/policy, so that poor households have incen-
tives to increase their earnings while other households do not have incentives to lie. Thus, it
removes the identification issue and the dependency issue from the source.
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1.2.5 Earned Income Tax Credit
EITC, or Earned Income Tax Credit, is a typical incentive-compatible transfer payment policy
in the United States (Nichols and Rothstein, 2015). It is a refundable tax credit program that was
launched during Ford’s administration in 1975. The idea is to use tax credits as a form of reward
to encourage households to increase their earnings. The more the households earned, the larger
the credits they will receive. This design is incentive-compatible. On the one hand, it resolves
the inaccurate identification issue since there will be no incentives for the households to pretend
to be poor since under-reporting leads to fewer credits. On the other hand, It resolves the welfare
dependency since the credit is no longer guaranteed, and households will always try to increase the
earnings to get more credits.
EITC was originated from president Lyndon Johnson’s idea to end poverty as a part of his ini-
tiatives of Great Society in 1964. Johnson argued, in his 1964 Economic Report, that providing
cash grants to the poor will not solve the problem from the root. As he put it, it would be far
better, even if more difficult to equip and permit the poor of the Nation to produce and earn the
additional money required to escape from the poverty (Ventry, 2000). His advocate is closely re-
lated to heavy welfare dependency at the time. One of the widely discussed cash grant alternatives
is the Negative Income Tax scheme. However, the design was criticized for being too expensive,
and for not being consistently incentive-compatible when combined with other social welfare pro-
grams. In order to resolve the dispute, starting from 1968, the Office of Economic Opportunity
conducted several large scale social experiments in New Jersey, Iowa, Washington, Colorado, and
Indiana. However, much of these efforts have gone wasted due to data manipulation, after which
NIT was terminated. It was not until 1975, when Ford’s administration sought for a major tax cut
to stimulate the economy, that the EITC came out with a low profile, and it was considered to be a
huge success. After which, EITC continued to expand and become one of the major anti-poverty
policy today. In the year of 2018, there were 25 million eligible workers and families received
about $63 billion in EITC (IRS, 2018), which is about $2,400 on average. It is proved that EITC
can effectively promote labor participation, increase income, and lift households out of poverty.
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Today, its achievements in anti-poverty and employment have been highly regarded all over the
world. There are at least 16 countries that have adopted similar policies such as the United King-
dom, Canada, New Zealand, Austria, France, Netherlands, Hungary, Ireland, Slovak, Spain, Italy,
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Korea, and Sweden.
1.3 Literature
There is a large body of non-experimental studies that backs up the success of EITC. Defining
EITC-type programs is difficult given the variety of forms it could take (Nichols and Rothstein,
2016. For this reason, I focus on studies that are closely related to EITC and experiment studies.
The EITC in the US was initially introduced in 1975. However, there was no EITC experiment
until 1995. The program experienced several major expansions in 1986, 1990, 1993, and 2009.
Therefore, most early studies use quasi-experiment designs to examine the impacts of EITC. From
1995, there have been three EITC experiments in North America, including Canada Self-Sufficient
Project (SSP), Minnesota Family Investment Program (MFIP), and New York Paycheck Plus Ex-
periment. For non-experimental studies, Eissa and Hoynes (2006) and Nichols and Rothstein
(2016) have complied reviews that cover most of the topics, including EITC history, the detailed
provisions, and studies. Studies that are more focused on specific topics are also very helpful to
understand EITC, such as the excellent historical review by Ventry (2000), and the discussion of
contemporary welfare reforms by Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001). These quality works provide
researchers insightful knowledge and perspectives about EITC.
1.3.1 Labor Participation
The results from the experimental studies are unambiguously positive in terms of employment
and earning (Card and Robins, 1996; Lin, 1998; Gennetian and Miller, 2000 Michalopoulos et al.,
2000; Gennetian et al., 2002; Michalopoulos et al., 2002; Card and Hyslop, 2005; Gennetian et al.,
2005; Miller et al., 2018).
As for non-experimental studies, most of the findings support the ideas that EITC has posi-
tive impact on labor force participation (extensive margin) (Eissa and Liebman, 1996; Eissa and
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Hoynes, 1998; Ellwood, 2000; Meyer and Rosenbaum, 2000; Meyer and Rosenbaum, 2001; Grog-
ger, 2003; Eissa and Hoynes, 2004; Rothstein, 2005; Hotz and Scholz, 2006; Bastian, 2017;
Hoynes and Patel, 2018) with few exceptions (Cancian and Levinson, 2005; Kleven, 2019). While
most positive effects are concentrated on single mothers and married men, several studies find that
labor force participation has reduced among married mothers (Eissa and Hoynes, 1998; Ellwood,
2000; Eissa and Hoynes, 2004).
Many early studies use the Difference-in-Differences approach to examine the impact of single
or multiple EITC expansions on labor supply (Eissa and Liebman, 1996; Ellwood, 2000; Hotz
and Scholz, 2000; Meyer and Rosenbaum, 2000; Rothstein, 2005). Most of the studies use single
mothers with fewer children as the control group and single mothers with more children as the
treatment group. For example, Eissa and Liebman (1996), Hotz and Scholz (2000), Meyer and
Rosenbaum (2001) compared single mothers with one child and single mothers with two or more
children. Ellwood (2000) and Rothstein (2005) use the variation of the credits across the income
group, and compared single mothers with different earning and working skills. Results show that
labor participation among single mothers increased 16% between 1993 and 2000. Meanwhile,
labor participation among singe mothers without children remained steady during the same period
(Eissa and Hoynes, 2006). Many researchers have found that single mothers with children who
have less income and education increased labor participation most during the expansion. More
importantly, they are also the ones that benefited the most from the expansions (Ellwood, 2000;
Rothstein, 2005; Meyer and Rosenbaum, 2000).
In general, the studies above showed that EITC has strong positive impacts on labor supply
among single mothers. Moreover, while the methodologies and subjects are different, the conclu-
sions are unambiguously consistent. As for magnitudes of the impact, it largely depends on which
expansion the study is examining. Eissa and Liebman (1996) studied the expansion in 1986, which
indicates that EITC increased labor participation by 2.8%. Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001) find
that, on average, EITC increased labor participation by 8.7% annually between 1984 and 1996. Its
impact between 1992 and 1996 was relatively small, only 3.5%.
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Later reforms introduce different benefit schemes for families with different structures. This
allows researchers to investigate how EITC can affect labor participation differently across differ-
ent households. For example, Eissa and Hoynes (2004) examine the labor participation response
of married couples to EITC expansions between 1984 and 1996. Results show that the EITC
expansions reduced the total labor supply of married couples, which is offset by the declines in
labor supplies among the wives, implying that the EITC is effectively subsidizing married mothers
to stay at home. More importantly, Eissa and Hoynes (2004)’s study shows that EITC schemes
do not necessarily provide work incentives to individuals homogeneously because labor supply
decisions were made jointly within households.
1.3.2 Hours Worked
In theory, EITC will decrease hours worked. However, both experimental and non-experimental
studies show little evidence that confirms the prediction. For example, Card and Robins (1996)
and Miller et al. (2018) find that EITC increases hours worked while Gennetian and Miller (2000)
and Gennetian et al. (2005) find the opposite. In addition to experiments with direct intervention
(program participation), Chetty and Saez (2013) implement an indirect intervention (information)
to identify the effects of EITC. The result shows that providing information about tax incentives
through tax preparers does not systematically affect earnings.
Similarly, most non-experimental studies also find no effect on hours worked (Eissa and Lieb-
man, 1996; Meyer and Rosenbaum, 2000; Cancian and Levinson, 2005; Rothstein, 2005) or
mixed results (Meyer and Rosenbaum, 2001). Eissa and Liebman (1996) use the Difference-in-
Differences approach and examine how EITC affects the hours worked. They find a significant
positive effect, but the size is very small. When they focus on less-educated single mothers, there
is no effect at all. Meyer and Rosenbaum (2000) find both positive and negative effects on hours
worked, but they are not significant. Rothstein (2005) finds no significant difference when com-
paring single mothers with children and single mothers without children across different income
levels. One of the main challenges here is that estimating the hours worked response of workers to
the EITC budget constraint is fundamentally a harder empirical problem (Eissa and Hoynes, 2006).
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Why has labor participation increased while the hours worked decreased? Eissa and Hoynes
(2006) reviewed four possible explanations. First of all, women’s labor supply could be inelastic,
which means the increase in hours, if any, was too small to be significant. Consequently, the in-
crease in labor supply was largely reflected by changes in employment status. Secondly, workers’
decisions on working are not continuous. Therefore, it could be difficult for them to make adjust-
ments. Thirdly, self-reported hours could generate measurement errors. Because the annual labor
supply is calculated by timing weeks worked per year and hours worked per week, attempting to
average the answer could make measurement errors more than the ordinary recall error. Lastly,
taxpayers might not be familiar with the EITC schemes, which could explain the inconsistency
between the theoretical prediction and actual behavior. Meyer (2010) thinks the lack of under-
standing of EITC schemes is the main reason why hours worked has decreased. As he put it, the
recent EITC instructions are as long as 14 pages. Thus, only a few people would spend time and
finish reading the whole tax document.
1.3.3 Earning
Without considering the changes in other policies and welfare programs, theoretically, tax-
payers who fall in the phase-out stage will reduce their income5. However, there are only a few
studies that focus on the impact on earnings. The results are somewhat mixed, too. Some studies
find positive impacts on earning (LaLumia, 2009; Rothstein, 2005; Chetty et al., 2013; Hoynes
and Patel, 2018), other studies find either no effect (Cancian and Levinson, 2005) or even strong
negative effect (Leigh, 2004). For example, Leigh (2004) and Rothstein (2005) have examined
EITC’s impact on pre-tax income. Leigh utilizes the variation of EITC schemes across different
states and finds that EITC has a very strong negative effect on earning. However, Rothstein studied
the EITC expansion in 1993 and find that earning and labor participation have increased simul-
taneously among low-skilled female workers. This result is later confirmed by one of the recent
studies by Hoynes and Patel (2018). Hoynes and Patel compare the states with different EITC
5A phase-out stage is a range of income in which the amount of credits decreases as the earning increases. Similarly,
a phase-in stage is a range of income in which the amount increases with the earning.
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generosities and find that EITC has increased income for population ranged from 75% to 150% of
the poverty line. There are reasons that can explain these mixed results. For instance, EITC might
have affected taxing behaviors differently across groups. Joulfaian and Rider (1998) use tax audit-
ing data in 1998 and examine the impact of EITC on tax evasion. Results show that the employers
in the phase-out range tend to under-report the income, but only a very little. There was no under-
reporting on the employee side. No over-reporting was found in the phase-in stage, neither. The
results are reasonable in the sense that there is a little room for the employers and employees with
formal contracts to manipulate their earnings, compared with the self-employed. LaLumia (2009)
uses tax return data and examine EITC’s impact on income among self-employed taxpayers. She
uses the Difference-in-Differences approach and compares taxpayers with children and taxpayers
without children. The result shows that the reported earning has increased by 3.2% to 4.1% among
the group that has the lowest income. This implies that the change in taxing behavior was more
prevalent among self-employed populations.
1.3.4 Consumption
Researchers are also curious about how EITC changes consumption. Although there are rela-
tively fewer studies that focus on consumption due to data limitations, the findings are consistent.
Researchers have found that households with EITC spend more on both durable (Barrow and Mc-
Granahan, 2000; Goodman-Bacon and McGranahan, 2008) and non-durable (Goodman-Bacon and
McGranahan, 2008; McGranahan and Schanzenbach, 2013) goods. For durable goods, Barrow and
McGranahan (2000) estimate and compare expenditure patterns between households with different
eligibility using Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES) data. They find households spent more on
total expenditures, durable goods, and big-ticket items. Goodman-Bacon and McGranahan (2008)
use the same data and directly compare the spending between households with different eligibility.
The results show that households that are eligible for EITC spend more on durables than non-
durables compared with ineligible households. In particular, households with EITC eligibility are
more likely to purchase vehicles. For nondurable goods, McGranahan and Schanzenbach (2013)
exploits the fact that EITC benefits are not paid out evenly across the calendar year to investigate
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its effect on food expenditure patterns of households. They find that households spend relatively
more on healthy food such as fresh fruit and vegetables. These findings are consistent with the
descriptive analysis (Smeeding et al., 2000; Linnenbrink et al., 2006; Mammen and Lawrence,
2006). At last, Barrow and McGranahan (2000)’s results suggest that households tried to smooth
their expenditures after receiving EITC benefits.
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2. WUTONGQIAO EXPERIMENT
Wutongqiao Experiment was conducted by China Household Finance and Survey (CHFS) be-
tween 2014 and 2017. 259 households were sanctioned by the local government for the experiment.
The households were later randomly assigned to the treatment group and the control group. All
the households in the treatment group enrolled in an EITC-type program-Labor Income Reward
Plan. Upon enrollment, households started receiving cash rewards every month. The amount of
reward depends on household earning in the last month. The offered EITC contains three stages,
including a phase-in, a plateau, and a phase-out. The amount of reward will first increase with
the earning (40%-50% phase-in rate). Then, it reaches the maximum (160 RMB or 200 RMB per
capita depending on the number of children) and no longer changes with the earning (plateau).
Eventually, the reward will start decreasing as households earn more and move into the phase-out
stage (40%-50% phase-out rate). Once the earning exceeds the break-even point (1,000 RMB per
capita), the household becomes ineligible for the program automatically. Enrolled households are
required to report their earnings and employment status every month to get the rewards. Each claim
needs supporting materials such as proof of employment and income (see Appendix A.5). House-
hold surveys were conducted periodically among households in both the treatment and the control
group to track changes such as employment, labor supply, earning, consumption, and self-reported
health conditions. Finally, I compare outcomes between the two groups to examine the impacts of
the EITC program.
The design has two important and unique features that are worth noting. First, it implements a
relatively strong treatment intensity (average reward is 20% of the monthly income) compared to
the existing studies (3%-7% of the income). Second, it employs a comprehensive measure to audit
and validate each claim. Given that China has a large portion of self-employed jobs, this validation
process is particularly crucial for the experiment since it is relatively easier for the self-employed
to manipulate earning compared to the employed with formal contracts.
Results show that Labor Income Reward Plan increases labor supply significantly on both
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extensive margin and intensive margin. Estimates show that the number of earners per household
has increased by 0.34 person (14% increase), and total hours worked has increased by 81 hours
per month (40%). Consequently, the monthly total earning (without the benefit) has increased by
569 RMB (82 USD), and the total expenditure has increased by 436 RMB (63 USD). The size of
the effects seems to be a lot larger than the existing literature, which is partially due to the strong
treatment intensity.
2.1 Experiment Design
Wutongqiao1 Experiment is conducted by China Households Finance Survey (CHFS) at South-
western University of Finance and Economics, China. The project started in May 2014. House-
holds in the samples were randomly offered with Labor Income Reward Plan. The program will
allow households to receive a cash reward every month that depends on their earnings of last month.
The scheme is incentive-compatible and similar to the EITC in the United States, and it is expected
to provide work incentives. On average, enrolled households received a 350 RMB (50 USD) cash
reward per month. The amount is roughly equivalent to 20% of households’ monthly income. It is
the first-ever EITC field experiment in a developing country.
2.1.1 Treatment
The scheme of the Labor Income Reward Plan is similar to EITC in the United States. To start
with, when a household has zero earning, the initial reward is zero. The reward will increase with
earning until it reaches a maximum level. Then, the reward remains at the maximum level regard-
less of the changes in earning (plateau). Later, the reward begins to decrease when the earning
is higher than a certain threshold (phase-out stage). The reward eventually diminishes to zero as
the earning continues to grow and passes the break-even point, at which point the household is no
longer eligible for the program. Namely, the reward will be a 50% of the earnings for households
with less one child, and a 40% for those with two or more children for the first 400 RMB (80 USD)
1Wutongqiao is a district in Leshan City in Sichuan Province with an area roughly the same as San Antonio. It
is a major chemical industry area in Leshan City. Wutongqiao has around 320,000 population with a GDP per capita
of 3,750 USD in 2010. In 2015, around 1.3% of its population lived under the national poverty-line (Wutongqiao
People’s Government, 2013).
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earning per capita. The reward is 200 RMB per capita for households with less than one child
and 160 RMB per capita for households with two or more children when the earning per capita is
between 400 RMB to 600 RMB. Then, the reward will start to decrease as earning increases. The
phase-out rate is 50% for households with less than one child and 40% for households with two
or more children. The reward will become zero once the earning reaches 1,000 RMB regardless
of the number of children. Figure 2.1 demonstrates how the reward per capita changes at different
stages.
Figure 2.1: Labor Income Reward Plan 2016 (Wutongqiao, The Experiment)
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Although the general setup is similar to EITC in the US, there is an important difference be-
tween the Labor Income Reward Plan and the US schemes. Specifically, after reporting household
earning each month, a per capita earning will be calculated by dividing the total earning by the fam-
ily size. Only spouse, parents, dependents, and members that have lived and shared expenditure
together will be considered as family members. Any senior member who receives a pension more
than 1,000 RMB per month will not be considered as a household member in spite of eligibility.
Then, the earning per capita is applied to Figure 2.1 to find out the amount of the reward per capita
for this particular household. The final amount of the reward will be the product of the reward
per capita and the family size. For example, assume a nuclear family (a couple with one child)
has no other source of income other than the 1,500 RMB earning from the father’s employment
last month. Then, the per capita earning of this household is 1500 ÷ 3 = 500 RMB per capita.
According to Figure 2.1, the household should be rewarded with 200 RMB per family member.
Finally, the total amount of reward is 200× 3 = 600 RMB. It is important to point out that having
more children not only reduces the per capita earning but also grants the family an additional share
of reward directly.
2.1.2 Timeline
The project started with a baseline survey among 808 households that reside in Wutongqiao
District. The sample was selected by a three-stage stratified random sampling method. The main
purpose of the baseline survey is to collect the basic socioeconomic status of the local population.
More importantly, this step is crucial for the project team to estimate the income eligibility for
the program and make sure the pending expenditure is feasible for the limited budget. Then, 65
households were selected for the pilot in December 2014. The experiment came ten months after
the pilot in October 2015. The sample for the experiment contains 194 households that reside in
Wutongqiao District. Finally, 1,362 households were added to the sample in March 2017. There is
no sample overlap between the pilot, the experiment, and the expansion. The EITC programs that
were offered are largely similar across different phases. Before March 2017, the experiment was
funded by donations, after which the local government took it over and expended the program to all
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Figure 2.2: Wutongqiao Experiment Timeline (2014-2017)
registered poor households in their entire jurisdiction. Therefore, this study will be only focusing
on the pilot and the experiment and only use survey data collected prior to 2017. Figure 2.2
describes the four major phases of Wutongqiao Experiment.
2.2 The Pilot
The purpose of the pilot is to figure out all policy parameters that will fit the budget, evaluate
the feasibility of the design, and anticipate potential problems during the implementation to reduce
the uncertainty of the experiment. Generally, it takes three steps to select the sample for the pilot.
STEP 1: A baseline survey was performed in May 2014. By using a three-stage stratified
random sampling method, the study sampled 808 households (476 from urban areas and 332 from
rural areas) from 16 communities across 4 (out of 13) towns in the Wutongqiao Districts. The
survey collects a variety of information such as demographics, employment status, assets, child
education, social security, income, and expenditure, etc.
STEP 2: The project team calculated the earning per capita for each household using the survey
data. Households with monthly earnings more than 1,200 RMB per capita were dropped2. By con-
trolling age, marriage, gender, income, social security, and household register, the research team
predicted the probability of employment for each individual in unemployed households. Then,
households were ranked by the probability of employment from the highest to the lowest. The first
130 households were chosen as the pre-screened pool. To guarantee the accuracy and credibility of
2This cut-off was chosen as the average income per person in the sample
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the information, the survey team re-visited these 130 households in October. The team also asked
the households if they are willing to take part in the experiment.
STEP 3: Based on their eligibility and their willingness to participate, the team eventually
selected 65 households and randomly assigned them into the treatment group and the control group.
The treatment group will enroll in the Labor Income Reward Plan. The control group was not
offered any form of reward. Other welfare programs remain the same for households in both of the
groups.
Pilot treatment: The scheme in the pilot has parameters slightly different from the scheme
in the experiment. First, the Labor Income Reward Plan that was offered in the pilot does not
distinguish the number of children in the households. Second, the maximum amount of reward
is 250 RMB instead of 200 RMB in the experiment. Both the phase-in rate and the phase-out
rate are 50%. Therefore, the reward per capita reaches its maximum when the earning per capita
reaches 500 RMB and start declining when it reaches 700 RMB. The break-even point is 1,200
RMB instead of 1,000 RMB as it is in the experiment. Figure A.18 describes the scheme that was
used in the pilot. Finally, the pilot treatment started in January 2015.
2.2.1 Data for the Pilot
Table 2.1 presents the data used in the pilot analysis3. The data is collected from the household
surveys that were conducted before and after the intervention started. The first round of the survey
was conducted upon enrollment in December 2014. Another survey was conducted four months
later in March 2015. Table A.4 presents the balance of covariates between the treatment and the
control groups in the pilot sample. I find no statistical difference between the two groups in terms
of demographics, labor supply, earning, and expenditure. The randomization is successful.
2.2.2 Results from the Pilot
By nature of the incentive-compatible design, the EITC program should provide work incen-
tives. Therefore, it is expected to increase labor supply. It is uncertain how earning would be
3There are some households that were not observed in the data due to their absences of the survey.
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Table 2.1: Data Used in the Pilot
# of Households Treatment Control
Dec. 2014 (pre) 27 32
Mar. 2015 (post) 21 32
affected. On the one hand, wage income may increase with employment. On the other hand, wage
income only captures the changes among the employed. Households may prefer other methods to
increase their earnings, such as farming and business. Moreover, even if a household increased
working hours immediately, there is no guarantee that the earning will rise. For formal employees,
it is hard to adjust work time. For self-employed individuals, a shop keeper may extend the busi-
ness hour immediately, but the revenue may not increase because there were no more customers. In
the following sections, I will first discuss the program’s effects on labor supply (on both extensive
margin and intensive margin). Then, I will discuss its effects on household earning.
The effects on labor supply are examined on both extensive and intensive margins. The ex-
tensive margin of household labor supply is measured by the number of earners in the household
during the last month. The intensive margin of household labor supply is measured by the total
hours worked for the primary job and the secondary job during the last month. The hours worked
are aggregated to the household-level so that it measures the sum of the hours across each family
member in the household. Figure 2.3 presents the treatment effects on household labor supply
estimated by OLS estimators. The result indicates that the Labor Income Reward Plan has positive
and significant impacts on the labor supply. Specifically, Labor Income Reward Plan increases the
number of earners per household by 0.336 and increases total hours worked for the primary job
by 105.1 hours per month. There is a positive but small effect (1.9 hours) on hours worked for the
secondary job. However, it is not statistically significant.
Household earning is measured by the earnings from the primary and the secondary job, profits
from farming as well as family-owned small businesses during the last month. Similar to total
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Figure 2.3: Treatment Effects on Household Labor Supply (The Pilot)
hours worked, they are aggregated to the household-level so that they measure the sums of the
earnings across each family member in the household. Figure 2.4 presents the treatment effects on
household earning estimated by OLS estimators. The result shows that the Labor Income Reward
Plan has a positive and significant impact on earnings from the secondary job. Specifically, Labor
Income Reward Plan has increased the earning by 66.6 RMB per month. There is a positive and
larger effect on earning from the primary job. However, it is not statistically significant. There is
no effect on household earning in terms of farming profit and business profit. The estimates are
very small and insignificant.
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Figure 2.4: Treatment Effects on Household Earning (The Pilot)
2.3 The Experiment
The experiment started in October 2015, after the pilot was completed. It also involves three
steps to select the sample. However, the procedure is completely different. Moreover, there is no
overlap between the pilot sample and the experiment sample.
STEP 1: Unlike the pilot sampling method, the households in the experiment sample are
referred by the local community committees4. Then, a baseline survey that is similar to the pilot
was completed among the referred households.
STEP 2: Based on the baseline survey, the research team computed the per capita income for
each household. Ineligible households were dropped. This includes households that have earning
4Households were referred based on committees’ knowledge about the economic conditions of these families and
their probabilities to get employed.
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per capita higher than 1,000 RMB, households that lost their abilities to work, and households that
do not wish to get employed.
STEP 3: Eligible households are ranked according to earning per capita from the highest to
the lowest. Households were split into odd-rank and even-rank group. Finally, the even-rank group
was randomly selected to be the treatment group.
Experiment treatment: To reiterate, the reward will be a 50% of the earnings for households
with less one child, and a 40% for households with two or more children for the first 400 RMB (80
USD) earning per capita. The reward is 200 RMB per capita for households with less than one child
and 160 RMB per capita for households with two or more children when the earning per capita is
between 400 RMB to 600 RMB. Then, the reward will start to decrease as earning increases. The
phase-out rate is 50% for households with less than one child and 40% for households with two or
more children. At this rate, the reward will decrease to zero once the earning reaches 1,000 RMB
per capita regardless of the number of children.
2.3.1 Data for the Experiment
Table 2.2 presents the data used in the experiment analysis5. The data is also collected from the
household surveys that were conducted before and after the intervention started. The first round
of the survey was conducted upon enrollment in November 2015. The following surveys were
conducted four months later in March 2016. I compared demographics, labor supply, earning, and
expenditures between households who always respond to the surveys and households who missed
at least one survey. I do not find any statistical difference between the twos (Table A.5).
Given the findings from the pilot, one should expect to see similar effects on labor supply and
earnings in the experiment. Figure A.1 shows the distribution of total hours worked among the
treatment and the control group. The hollow columns represent the frequency of the observations
in the pre-intervention period. The solid columns represent the frequency of the observations
in the post-intervention period. By visual comparison, the distribution of the treatment group
5Similar to the pilot, there are some households that were not observed in the data due to their absences of the
surveys.
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Table 2.2: Data Used in the Experiment
# of Households Treatment Control
Nov. 2015 (pre) 103 91
Mar. 2016 (post) 94 76
May. 2016 (post) 82 65
Sep. 2016 (post) 79 63
Nov. 2016 (post) 77 54
Jan. 2017 (post) 78 61
has skewed to the right after the intervention, while the control group remained relatively the
same. This indicates that there exists a potential treatment effect on hours worked. Figure A.2
shows the distribution of household earning among the treatment and the control group. Similar
to Figure A.1, the distribution of the treatment group skewed to the right after the intervention.
Its counterpart remained relatively the same. This indicates that there exists a potential treatment
effect on household earning, too. At last, Figure A.3 shows the distribution of household total
expenditures among the treatment and the control group. There is no notable difference between
the treatment and the control group.
2.3.2 Methodology
The treatment assignment in the experiment was originally random. However, around 20% of
the sample was switched at the request of the local government. The idea is to benefit as many
poor households as possible. Consequently, the treatment group is relatively poorer (Table A.6).
Since the treatment assignment in the sample is only random prior to the switching, it is likely
that OLS estimates would be biased due to non-random switching. However, I can still recover
the intention-to-treat effect by using the initial assignment as an instrument. Namely, I aggregate
the data to the household-level and use the initial assignment to instrument for the actual treatment
status. Meanwhile, I am taking advantage of the panel data and controlling for household fixed
effect as well as time fixed effect. The coefficients are to be estimated by the regressions below:
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First-stage: Ti,t = αi + λt + βDi,t + εi,t (2.1)
Reduced form: Yi,t = αi + λt + δDi,t + ξi,t (2.2)
where Ti,t is actual treatment status for household i at time t. Di,t is the initial treatment status
for household i at time t. αi is household fixed effect. λt is time fixed effect. Yi,t is outcome
variable. εi,t and ξi,t are the error terms.
For the instrument to work, the relevance assumption (the instruments predict the endogenous
variables well) and the exclusion restriction (the instruments only affect the outcome variables
through the instrumented variables) must be satisfied. The relevance assumption can be tested
during the first-stage regression. I show that the relevance assumption is satisfied by a strong
first-stage (Table A.8). For the exclusion restriction, I show that the randomization for the initial
assignment is successful (Table A.7). Therefore, the initial assignment only affects the outcome
variables via the actual treatment status.
Later, I allow the treatment effects to vary across time periods to recover dynamic treatment
effects. However, this will also introduce additional endogenous variables, which means that
the first-stage is going to be different. Namely, in the new first stage, βDi,t is replaced with∑T
t=1 βtTreatment0,i × It(time = t), and Ti,t is replaced with Treatmenti × It(time = t).
Treatmenti is a dummy variable that equals one if household i is actually assigned to the treat-
ment group, and Treatment0,i (instrument) is a dummy variable that equals one if household i is
initially assigned to the treatment group. It(time = t) is a dummy variable that equals one if the
data is observed in time t. There are five regressions in the first-stage estimation. I dropped the
first period to avoid perfect multicollinearity problem and show that the relevance assumption is
satisfied with a strong first-stage (Table A.9).
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2.3.3 Results from the Experiment
Although the sample and identification strategies are different, one should expect that the re-
sults from the experiment to be similar to the pilot. The results in the pilot show that the Labor
Income Reward Plan increases the number of earners in the household, hours worked for the pri-
mary job, and earnings for the secondary job. In the following section, I will discuss the impacts
of the Labor Income Reward Plan on labor supply, earning, and expenditure.
2.3.3.1 Impacts on Household Labor Supply
Figure 2.5 shows the treatment effects on household labor supply. The result indicates that the
Labor Income Reward Plan has positive and significant impacts on the labor supply. Specifically,
Labor Income Reward Plan increases the number of earners per household by 0.329 and increases
hours worked for the primary job by 86.0 hours. There is a negative but small effect (5.3 hours)
on hours worked for the secondary job. However, it is not statistically significant. I consider these
results are similar to the pilot.
Figure A.4 shows the dynamic treatment effects on the number of earners per household. The
baseline period (Nov-15, pre) is dropped to avoid perfect multicollinearity problem. The result
indicates that the effects are persistent throughout time periods. The magnitude of the effect ranges
from 0.269 to 0.451. Not surprisingly, I find similar persistence in dynamic treatment effects on
total hours worked (Figure A.5). Moreover, there are increases in all dimensions (weeks worked
per month, days worked per week, and hours worked per day) in terms of labor supply for the
primary job implying the increase in labor supply is primarily driven by the increase in the number
of earners per household (Table A.16).
2.3.3.2 Impacts on Household Earning
Figure 2.6 presents the treatment effects on household earning. The result shows that the
Labor Income Reward Plan has a positive and significant impact on earning from the primary
job. Specifically, Labor Income Reward Plan increases the earning from the primary job by 560
RMB per month. The effects on households monthly earning for the secondary job is negative
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Figure 2.5: Treatment Effects on Household Labor Supply
but relatively small (14 RMB), and the estimate is statistically insignificant. As for profits from
farming and business, the effects are small and positive but statistically insignificant. This result
is consistent with the findings in household labor supply since the increase in hours worked for
the primary job is both large and statistically significant while the increase in hours worked for the
secondary job is small and insignificant.
Figure A.6 shows the dynamic treatment effects on household earning from the primary job.
The magnitude of the effect ranges from 250 RMB to 840 RMB. The dynamic treatment effects
are persistent throughout times except for September, making the effects less persistent than labor
supply. I can think of three potential explanations. First, compared to measuring hours worked,
the measurement error issue is often more complicated when measuring earnings. Second, the
statistical power might not be large enough to produce significance in the panel analysis. Finally,
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earning from self-employment jobs might not be paid regularly throughout the year. It is possible
that a part of the effect is conditioned on seasonality.
Figure 2.6: Treatment Effects on Household Earning
2.3.3.3 Impacts on Household Expenditure
Figure 2.7 presents the treatment effects on household expenditure. The result indicates that
households in the treatment group have significantly increased the expenditure on food (159 RMB)
and education (226 RMB). The expenditure on transportation has also increased, but the estimate
is statistically insignificant. This insignificant effect might be partially driven by work-related
transportation costs such as fuel for rickshaw taxis, which is quite common among self-employed
workers in the local area. However, there is available data to support such an argument. I find
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Labor Income Reward Plan has small and positive but insignificant effects on expenditures on
eating-out, utilities, sundries, communication, and clothing.
Figure A.10 shows the dynamic treatment effects on food expenditure. Since it is unlikely
that I have enough power to yield significance, I will focus on the magnitude only. The pattern
suggests that the size of the effect is potentially related to seasonality. I consider this reasonable
since households tend to rely more on their own supplies after the harvesting season started.
Figure A.11 shows the dynamic treatment effect on education expenditure. There was a rela-
tively larger effect in September 2016 when the fall semester began. The second-largest effect was
in March 2016 when the spring semester began. The rest of the effects are small and statistically
insignificant. By the look of the timing, it seems that the increases in education expenditure are
semester-related such as tuition. If this increase in education expenditure is tuition, I would like
to verify that these effects are re-occurring. However, the data is not long enough for me to check
if this is true. It might be the case in which the treatment group happens to have more kids in
colleges. I show that the treatment group has more individuals that fall in the college-age group
(18-22) (Table A.22). For this reason, I divide the sample into the “college group” and the “non-
college group” and perform the same regression. Figure A.12 shows that it is “the college group”
that was driving the treatment effects with the exact same pattern of occurrences while there is no
effect in the other group. This means the treatment effect is not driven by the fact that the treatment
group has more college students.
Since it is obvious that a large part of the effect is driven by the education expenditure (Fig-
ure A.7), I excluded the education expenditure and performed the same regression again. Fig-
ure A.8 shows the dynamic treatment effects on household total expenditure without education.
The effects are less persistent throughout time, but the overall effect is still positive and significant
(Figure A.9).
2.3.3.4 Impacts on Health
Since households have spent more on food, I am also curious about whether the nutrition status
has improved. Unfortunately, I do not have direct measures of any nutrition intake, but I do have
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Figure 2.7: Treatment Effects on Household Expenditure
some measures on health outcomes from the household surveys. Since health outcomes cannot be
aggregated to the household-level, I use similar specifications but with individual-level data and
replace household fixed effect with individual fixed effect. I show that first-stage regressions using
the individual-level data satisfy the relevance assumption (Table A.18 and A.19). Figure 2.8 shows
the treatment effect on health outcomes. Since health outcomes are measured in occurrences of
symptoms, which are negative outcomes, a negative coefficient indicates a relief of the symptom,
while a positive one indicates a deterioration. The result shows that the number of claims of
fever and heart palpitation has significantly decreased among households in the treatment group.
The claims of discomfort and the claims of cough have decreased while the number of claims of
diarrhea has increased. However, the estimates are small and statistically insignificant. Although
there are medical studies that back up the reliefs in fever (Wu et al., 2004; Victora et al., 2008)
and heart palpitation (Webb et al., 1986; Amare et al., 2015; Sze et al., 2018), I do not want to
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over-interpret these results since the data does not observe the nutrition status directly. In addition,
these effects might not be from the increases in food intake alone but also other aspects such as
labor participation. For example, some of the labor-intensive jobs can also be seen as physical
exercises. These physical exercises can potentially strengthen the immune system and reduce the
chance of fever as well. Figure A.13 and A.14 show the dynamic treatment effects on the claims of
fever and heart palpitation. The pattern of the effects on heart palpitation seems to be seasonal. A
potential explanation is that heart palpitation is one of the common allergic reactions, and allergic
symptoms are usually seasonal.
Figure 2.8: Treatment Effects on Health
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2.3.3.5 Impacts on Employment Type
There is another thing I am particularly interested in, which is the effects on employment type.
In the US EITC literature, researchers find no effect or mixed results. One explanation is that
workers are unable to choose continuous hours worked (Eissa and Hoynes, 2006). I find that the
average earning from the employed jobs (1,357 RMB per month) is twice as high as self-employed
ones (646 RMB per month). Thus, for those who are already working, a better way to increase
earning (instead of increase hours) is to switch to a better-paid employment type. Therefore, I
expect to see differences in terms of switching behavior between the treatment and the control
group.
Figure A.15 to A.17 show the percentages of individuals in the treatment/control group with
a certain type of switching behavior6. For example, the first two columns in Figure A.15 show
that, for people who were previously unemployed before the treatment, 82.0% of the individu-
als in the treatment group remained unemployed after the intervention while 85.5% individuals
in the control group have done so. In other words, for those who did not have a job prior to the
intervention, compared with the control group, fewer people in the treatment group remained un-
employed. Slightly more people in the treatment group became either self-employed or employed
after the intervention. For those who were self-employed prior to the intervention, compared with
the control group, fewer individuals in the treatment group became unemployed after the interven-
tion. More people in the treatment group remained either self-employed or became employed after
the intervention (Figure A.16). For those who were employed prior to the intervention, compared
with the control group, fewer people in the treatment group became unemployed. More people
in the treatment group became self-employed, and fewer people in the treatment group remained
employed (Figure A.17). The three figures depict a picture in which previously unemployed indi-
viduals in the treatment group are only doing slightly better than their counterparts in the control
6It is tricky to present the switching since there are multiple panels, and an individual can switch for multiple
times. For this reason, I only consider the first two panels in the data to make things easier. I use the number of
individuals who did a certain type of switching as the numerator and use the total number of able-bodied persons as
the denominator to adjust for the compositional differences between the treatment and the control group.
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group. Previously self-employed individuals in the treatment group are doing a lot better in stay-
ing self-employed and switching to employed jobs. When previously employed individuals change
their current work type, more individuals in the treatment group preferred self-employment rather
than exiting the labor force.
Figure 2.9 shows the treatment effect on employment type. I use individual-level data for
this regression because employment types cannot be aggregated. Here, the dependent variables
are dummies that indicates one of the tree employment types (unemployed, employed, and self-
employed) for individual i at time t. The result shows that the Labor Income Reward Plan sig-
nificantly decreases the probability of unemployed. I find positive but insignificant effects on the
probabilities of employed and self-employed.
Figure 2.9: Treatment Effects on Employment Type
34
2.3.4 Why There Are So Many Self-employed Lost Their Jobs?
It is notable that 40% of the individual in the treatment group have lost their jobs after the
intervention (Figure A.16). I argue this phenomenon is largely due to the labor division among
the dual-income households7. To better understand why, the first column on the left in Fig-
ure A.19 shows that dual-income households earned more than single-income households. This
makes sense because there are more earners in dual-income households. When comparing earnings
from employed jobs, people in single households earned roughly the same as their counterparts in
dual-income households. However, when comparing earnings from self-employed jobs, people
in dual-income households earned considerably less than those who are in single-income house-
holds. Moreover, the data showed that individuals who have self-employed jobs in the two groups
worked about the same length of time each month. This indicates that self-employed individuals
in two types of households are doing different jobs. To put the pieces together, it looks like that,
within dual-income households, there is usually a primary earner who has an employed job and a
secondary earner who has a self-employed job. Although there is only scattered information in the
data that allows me to have some idea about what exactly these jobs are, the information indicates
that they are something such as holding a street stall. These jobs are typically low labor-intensive
but could have very long working hours. These jobs are often something people can do while
performing housework or taking care of children at the same time. It is possible that it is rela-
tively easier for these secondary earners to quit their jobs occasionally because of the uncertainty
besides the fact that there is a primary source of income in the household. However, this is not true
anymore when households enrolled in the Labor Income Reward Plan. This explains why treated
individuals who were previously employed would rather switch to self-employed jobs instead of
becoming unemployed (Figure A.17). If the argument is true, I should be able to see that the ef-
fect on labor supply is larger among dual-income households. I show that this is the exact case
(Figure A.20).
7Households have more than one source of income.
35
2.3.5 Do Households React to Different Marginal Reward?
By design, the Labor Income Reward Plan has a positive marginal reward in the phase-in stage,
a zero marginal reward in the plateau, and a negative marginal reward in the phase-out stage. The-
oretically, households would only increase their labor supply when the marginal reward is positive.
I divide the households into three groups based on which stage they were prior to the treatment.
Figure A.21 shows sub-group estimates for three major outcome variables (employment, earning,
and consumption). The results show that it is households on the phase-out stage that are more
responsive to the program. This is not surprising since the labor supply decisions are not made
based on the Labor Income Reward Plan scheme alone. For example, there might be many other
constraints that bind the households from increasing their labor supplies such as children, illness,
education, and economic opportunity. I argue that one of the main reasons why phase-out house-
holds are more responsive to the program is that most of the dual-income families are located in the
phase-out stage (Table A.21). This implies that marginal reward makes little difference in house-
holds’ decisions compared with the program’s ability to prevent self-employed from occasional
unemployment.
2.4 Is It Worth Investing Money?
One of the prize-winning questions is whether it is worth investing money in the Labor Income
Reward Plan? Unfortunately, I am unable to answer this question using regressions due to the data
limitation, but I do know that households involved in the analysis are getting an average reward of
348 RMB per month on average. With the results from the previous sections, I adjust the effects
with the cost accordingly. Without considering administration cost, I estimated that each 100 RMB
reward per month for a family, would yield 0.1 additional earners, 23 hours worked, 163 RMB of
additional earning. More importantly, I calculate that each 100 RMB spent on the Labor Income
Reward Plan would increase 125 RMB in consumption. This amount is larger than 107 RMB-the
estimated return of a 100 RMB in fixed capital investment (STCN, 2017). There is no way that
these calculations to be taken seriously, but it looks promising, especially the effects on earning
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and consumption. The evidence supports my argument at the beginning-an incentive-compatible
transfer program will help the poor and the consumption at the same time.
2.5 Summary
China currently has no in-work benefits nor social welfare programs such as the Earned In-
come Tax Credits in the United States. Yet, the literature and global evidence have suggested
EITC-type programs’ potentials on poverty alleviation and work incentives. More importantly, the
performance of current transfer programs is very unsatisfactory. An opportunity arises if China
can substantially increase cash transfer. This experiment presents the first-ever EITC field experi-
ment in China with strong treatment intensity (20% of household income) and rigorous validation
procedure.
The pilot shows that the Labor Income Reward Plan significantly increases household labor
supply on both extensive margin and intensive margin. The number of earners per household has
increased by 0.336, and total hours worked has increased by 105.1 hours per month. As for earning,
household earning from secondarys job has increased by 66.6 RMB per month.
The experiment finds results that are similar to the pilot. Results show that Labor Income
Reward Plan significantly increased the number of earners per household by 0.329, total hours
worked for the primary job by 86.0 hours per month. It also significantly increases the household
earning by 560 RMB per month. This result is consistent with the findings in household labor
supply since the increase in household labor supply for the primary job is also large and statistically
significant. The effects are persistent throughout different periods. As for consumption, I find
an overall positive effect on total expenditure. Specifically, households in the treatment group
increase food expenditures by 160 RMB per month. Results also show that households in the
treatment group increase education expenditures by 226 RMB per month. Evidence suggests that
these expenditures are college-related.
Finally, I explored the effects on employment type. I find individuals in the control group
are more likely to become unemployed compared with the treatment group. The evidence suggests
that the Labor Income Reward Plan not only provides work incentives but also prevents households
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from quitting jobs. This prevention effect is especially important among dual-income households.
The study has important policy implications and contributes to a large literature that studies the
effect of in-work benefits.
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3. MABIAN/MUCHUAN EXPERIMENT
Mabian/Muchuan Experiment was conducted by China Household Finance and Survey (CHFS)
between 2017 and 2018. The experiment was conducted in Mabian county and Leshan county.
Both counties are located in Leshan City, Sichuan Province, China. Each county had four villages
that participated in the experiment. Half of the villages are treated. Namely, there are totally eight
villages that participated in the experiment. Four of the eight villages are chosen as the treatment
villages. The rest of the villages will serve as the control villages. All registered poor households in
the treatment villages are offered with a bundle that contains an EITC-type program-Labor Income
Reward Plan. Upon enrollment, households will start receiving cash rewards every quarter (for
three quarters). The amount of the EITC depends on household earning in the last month. The
offered EITC contains only a phase-in stage with a phase-in rate of from 10% to 15%. The rest
of the bundle contains a 50% of kick-starter fund subsidy and a price subsidy for farm products.
Households can choose to receive reward/subsidy through either method or all methods. However,
there is a maximum amount of reward per quarter. In addition, there is a limit to the total amount
of the reward for three quarters combined. The limits apply to the bundle, which means it accounts
for both EITC and other subsidies above. Each claim needs supporting materials such as proof of
employment and income (see Appendix B.3). Finally, household surveys were conducted among
households in both the treatment villages and the control villages prior and post to intervention.
The design has several important and unique features. First, it implements a relatively strong
treatment intensity (17% of the monthly income). Second, it employs a comprehensive measure
to audit and validate each earning claim. Given that China has a large portion of self-employed
jobs, this validation process is particularly crucial for the experiment since it is relatively easier for
the self-employed to manipulate earnings compared to the employed with formal contracts. Third,
the EITC policies were offered with other supplemental components that vary across the counties.
This gives me a valuable opportunity to see how EITC interacts with other typical anti-poverty
policies in China. Finally, this is the first EITC experiment that was conducted in China with a
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focus on rural/minority populations.
Results show that Labor Income Reward Plan increases the labor supply significantly on both
extensive margin and intensive margin. Estimates show that the average number of earners per
household has increased by 0.30 person (13% increase), and the total hours worked has increased
by 77 hours (41%). Consequently, households’ monthly wage earnings (without the benefit) has
increased by 466 RMB (63 USD). The size of the effects seems to be a lot larger than the existing
literature, which is partially due to the strong treatment intensity. Moreover, the effects are very
similar to the findings from the previous Wutongqiao Experiment. Distribution tests suggest that
the program may have increased households’ expenditures in food and transportation and reduced
expenditures on wedding and funeral. Although I only find suggestive evidence that the program
increases in household expenditure, the results suggest that the EITC has achieved its designed
purpose, which is to increase the labor supply and earning.
3.1 Experiment Design
The Mabian/Muchuan1 Experiment was conducted by China Households Finance Survey (CHFS),
at Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, China. The experiment started in April
2017. All registered poor households in the treatment villages were offered with Labor Income
Reward Plan. The program will allow households to receive a cash reward every quarter. On aver-
age, enrolled households received a 211 RMB (30 USD) cash reward each month. The amount is
roughly equivalent to 17% of households’ monthly income. This is the first EITC experiment that
was conducted in China with a focus on rural/minority populations.
3.1.1 Treatment
All registered poor households are offered a policy bundle that contains either two or three
components depending on the county the households reside in. The first component is the EITC
component. The amount of the reward is a fixed percentage of household earning in the last quar-
1Mabian is a minority autonomous region in China with an area similar to the city of Jacksonville in the US.
Mabian county has a population of around 220,000. The GDP per capita is 2,480 USD in 2017 (Mabian People’s
Government, 2016). Muchuan is a county with an area slightly larger than Phoenix. Muchuan county has a population
of around 260,000 with a GDP per capita of 2,460 USD in 2011 (Muchuan People’s Government, 2011).
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ter. The rate is either 6% or 10%, depending on the county. Unlike the typical EITC scheme, the
EITC scheme in this particular experiment only contains a phase-in stage. The EITC is distributed
once every quarter. However, households are required to report their earnings monthly. The second
component is the price subsidy for farm products. This means that households can receive a per-
centage of the revenue they received from selling their farm products. For example, if a household
earned 1,500 RMB by selling ducks. They can apply for a price subsidy that equals 8% of the sales.
The rates of subsidies vary across products and county. Similar to the EITC, the price subsidy is
usually distributed quarterly, and households are required to report their sales revenue monthly.
The last component is the kick-starter fund subsidy that equals 50% of the cost of the farm project,
including products such as cash-crop growing, greenhouse, and livestock raising. The subsidy only
covers one-time investment, such as seed and pen construction, and it does not cover costs such
as labor and fertilizer. This component is distributed quarterly and is only available to households
in Muchuan County. Appendix B.1 and B.2 show the bundles that were offered to households in
Mabian and Muchuan Counties. In addition, the maximum reward for each quarter is 1,500 RMB
(2,500 RMB for Muchuan County). The maximum reward for three quarters combined is 7,000
RMB (4,000 RMB for Muchuan County). When the calculated amount exceeds the quarterly limit,
the extra amount will be forwarded to the next quarter.
3.1.2 Timeline
The experiment started with a baseline survey in April 2017. Then, the intervention started
immediately after the baseline survey. Households were required to report earnings as well as
provide supporting materials monthly during the intervention period. Community staff will review
the integrity and validity of the submitted materials. The reported earnings, supporting materials,
and the calculated reward were audited and approved by CHFS quarterly, after which the reward
was distributed within the first ten days of each quarter. There are totally three quarters in the
intervention period. The intervention stopped in January 2018. Finally, a follow-up survey was
conducted in April 2018. Figure 3.1 describes the major phases of Mabian/Muchuan Experiment.
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Figure 3.1: Mabian/Muchuan Experiment Timeline (2017-2018)
3.1.3 Implementation
Although the policy bundles in two counties are different, the implementation procedure is
identical. This section will briefly discuss how the policy was implemented during the intervention
period and how households can access the program.
Preparation - Eligible households (all registered poor households in the treatment villages)
first applied for participation through CHFS prior to the intervention started. Then, information
sessions were carried out to inform the participated households about the program mechanism. A
team made of eight to ten local community staff was appointed to administer the program in each
treatment village. The staff was appointed by the local authorities. Each team participated in a
training session before the experiment. In addition, a cross-validation procedure was implemented
within the team. Namely, the staff from the same team will check and review the works of others.
Finally, both information sessions and training sessions were carried out by CHFS.
First-time applicant - Upon enrollment, households were required to sign the consent form
(Appendix B.2) and fill out the application form (Appendix B.2). Then, the forms were reviewed
and signed by the community staff.
Income report - Households are required to document and report the income every month as
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well as providing the supporting materials (see Appendix B.3). All the required documents need
to be prepared properly, signed, and submitted to the community staff between the 20th and 24th
of each month. Upon acceptance, the community staff will also sign and date the documents.
Late submission will be forwarded to the next month. The community staff will then calculate the
earnings and upload the data to the audit system in the next five days.
Approval - CHFS will review all the materials and calculate the reward within the first ten
days of each quarter (including forwarding the excess amount). Then, results will be sent to the
community staff in each village. The community staff will confirm the amount of the reward and
compile the forms (Appendix B.2) to be approved then submit them to the township governments
in the next five days. The reward for each household will be published and open to the public for
any inquiry for five days, after which the governments will seal the approvals and submit them to
the county’s office of poverty alleviation. Finally, the office will directly transfer the reward to the
bank accounts of the applicants.
3.2 Survey Data
The survey sample was restricted to the villages that participated in the experiment. Each
county had two treatment villages and two control villages. Boxiang, Ciwan, Gantianba, and
Qianguang are the treatment villages. Erping, Fengxi, Hejia, and Jinpen are the control villages.
Households were randomly selected for surveys for each of the eight villages. There were 2,778
households that were selected for the household surveys. This sample size is calculated based on
the power of 95%.
Table 3.1 presents the data used in the analysis2. The data is collected via two rounds of house-
hold surveys that were conducted before and after the intervention. The first round of the survey
was conducted prior to the intervention in April 2017. The follow-up surveys were conducted after
the intervention in April 2018.
The first column in Table B.4 presents the household characteristics in the sample, including
labor supply, demographics, and socioeconomic status. 1,511 households have responded to the
2A proportion of the households absented either the baseline survey or the follow-up survey or both.
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Sample Size 1,511 883
baseline survey. There are several aspects that are worth mentioning. First, the average family
size (4.26) tends to be larger compared with the urban sample in Wutongqiao Experiment (2.91).
Consequently, the average number of able-bodied persons is higher (2.66). This is one of the main
differences between households in rural and urban areas. Second, 37% of the households in the
sample are registered poor households. Moreover, more than half (55.7%) of the registered poor
households reported the main causes of their poverty are health-related. Third, the wage income
contributes only a small proportion of the total income primarily because the experiment site is in
rural areas. Moreover, more than half of the households in the sample are minorities. Thus, the
language barrier makes entering the labor market even more difficult for these families. Finally, the
self-reported expenditure tends to be larger than the self-reported income, which is typical among
household surveys.
There is a notable decline in sample size in the follow-up survey, which is primarily due to
the no-shows in the follow-up survey. The main concern of this loss of sample is that it might
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introduce bias when estimating the treatment effects. Two-sample tests show that households
that did not show up during the follow-up survey are statistically different from households that
attended both surveys in many aspects (Table B.3). Namely, the no-show households tend to have
less income, less labor supply, fewer jobs, and fewer able-bodied persons. No-show households are
less likely to be registered poor households, less likely to come from the treatment villages, more
likely to be a minority household, and less likely to have a pensioner in the household. However,
these differences indicate that the disadvantaged (lower labor supply and income) households in
the control villages are more likely to miss the follow-up survey. This means that the outcome
variables, such as labor supply and income in the control villages, will be over-estimated in the
follow-up survey. Consequently, the treatment effects are likely to be underestimated. Therefore,
it is unlikely that the effects are driven by the selection in no-shows.
3.3 Methodology
Given the fact that the treatment was assigned on the village-level and the fact that there were
only eight villages, the design of the experiment is more of a quasi-experiment study rather than
a field experiment. Thus, a classic approach to identify the treatment effects is by using the
Difference-in-Differences (DD) estimation. The DD estimation imposes the identification assump-
tion that the changes in the control group will provide a good counterfactual for the changes in the
treatment group in the absence of the intervention, which is usually referred to as the “common
trend” assumption. However, there is no way to test this assumption due to the fact that there are
only two panels of survey data (Table 3.1). A second-best solution is to compare the characteristics
of the households in the treatment villages and the control villages. If there is no statistical differ-
ence in household characteristics (except for outcome variables such as income and labor supply)
between the treatment group and the control group, it can be argued that the identification assump-
tion would hold. Table B.4 shows the balance of covariates of households in the treatment villages
and the control villages. Unfortunately, results show that households in the treatment group are
less likely to be a minority household and tend to have fewer jobs. The differences are statistically
significant. This means any effect that could be identified by the DD estimation is caused by either
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the policy or the differences in household characteristics, or both, which will severely hamper the
validity of the analysis. The last resort is to control for these differences and hope that controlling
for the observables will also resolve the bias caused by the unobservables. However, it is generally
considered that such an estimation is not reliable. To alleviate this problem, I will use DD estima-
tion with extensive controls and village fixed-effects to recover the treatment effect. Meanwhile, I
will estimate the treatment effect using three other methods, including Propensity-score Matching
(PSM), DD estimation with Propensity-score Matching (PSM-DD), and Difference-in-Difference-
in-Differences (DDD). Given that most outcome variables are household-level outcomes, I aggre-
gated the data to the household-level. There will be an independent analysis in the next sections
that discuss the impacts on individual-level outcomes.
PSM is generally considered to be less-than-ideal primarily because the matching on observ-
ables does not guarantee the balances on unobservables. In order to alleviate this concern, I will
use a one-to-one matching method and match observations based on all of the outcome variables
as well as all of the household characteristics. Then, I will use additional tests to ensure the match
is successful.
PSM-DD is a combination between PSM and DD estimation. The DD estimation resolves a
part of the potential bias (observable and unobservable) caused by the differences between the
treatment and the control group. Since PSM-DD should yield the same estimates if PSM success-
fully removes the bias, PSM-DD also serves as a check of PSM estimation. In order to make sure
any difference between the two estimations is not caused by the differences in matching methods, I
will use the exact same matching result from the PSM for PSM-DD. Finally, both PSM and PSM-
DD will be matching the eligible households (registered poor households in the treatment villages)
with other households since it comes with a larger pool of candidates that increases the chance of
successful matching.
Since only registered poor households are eligible for the program, it provides a third difference
other than the time difference (pre/post) and the village difference (the treatment/control villages).
Compared with the DD estimation, the DDD estimation resolves a part of the bias that causes the
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difference in “trends”. However, it only resolves the part of the bias that brings the same difference
between the two groups. If the DD estimation is without this sort of bias, the DDD estimation
should give similar (not identical) results. Thus, the DDD estimation provides a comparison to
the DD estimation. In order to make the estimations as comparable as they can be, I will use the
same set of factors that were used in PSM and PSM-DD as the controls for the DD estimation and
the DDD estimation. Finally, it is important to point out that all estimation recover the Treatment
Effect on the Treated (ATT) except for the DD estimation, which recovers the Average Treatment
Effect (ATE).
3.4 Results
The results from the Wutongqiao Experiment show that the Labor Income Reward Plan in-
creases the number of earners in the household, hours worked, earning, and expenditure. Although
the samples and identification strategies are different, one should expect that the results to be simi-
lar to the Wutongqiao Experiment. In the following section, I will discuss the impacts of the policy
on labor supply, earning, production, and expenditure.
3.4.1 Matching
Table B.5 shows the results of the matching. The households are matched based on both out-
come variables and household characteristics in the pre-period. Results indicate that the covariates
between the two groups are balanced after matching. In addition, there are two additional tests to
evaluate the overall matching success. Rubins’ B measures the absolute standardized difference of
the means of the linear index of the propensity score between the two groups. Rubin’s R measures
the ratio of the variances of the propensity-score index between the two groups. It is recommended
that a successful matching should have a B less than 25 and an R between 0.5 and 2 (Rubin, 2001).
The result shows that the Rubins’ B for the matching is 25.0, and the R is 1.03. Therefore, the two
groups are sufficiently balanced after matching.
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3.4.2 Impacts on Labor Participation
The number of earners and the number of jobs in the household reflect the extensive aspect of
the labor supply. An individual is defined as earner if he/she reported that he/she had worked in
the past year. The number of earners is the total number of earners in the household. Similarly, the
number of jobs is the total number of jobs in the household. The last two rows of Table 3.2 presents
the treatment effects on extensive labor supply. The result indicates that the Labor Income Reward
Plan has positive and significant impacts on extensive labor supply. Namely, program participation
increases the number of earners and the number of jobs. More importantly, the magnitudes and
the significance of the estimates are consistent across the regressions. The magnitude of the effect
on the number of earners ranges from 0.30 person to 0.54 persons per household. The estimated
effect on the number of jobs ranges from 0.44 jobs to 0.96 jobs per household. The results from
the PSM estimation are slightly smaller than the ones from the PSM-DD estimation. This suggests
that there exists a potential unaddressed bias in the PSM estimation. However, it tends to bias the
result downward. Therefore, this should not be a concern. The results from the DDD estimation
are larger than their counterparts in the DD estimation, which is expected since the DD estimation
yields ATE. The size of the effect falls between the estimates from the PSM estimation and the
PSM-DD estimation. Therefore, these findings are reasonably convincing.
3.4.3 Impacts on Hours Worked
The total hours worked reflects the intensity aspect of the labor supply. The variable is cal-
culated based on four questions in the survey. Namely, household members were first asked how
many months they had been working in the past year (2016 or 2017). Then, household members
were asked, on average, how many weeks they had been working per month. Next, household
members were asked, on average, how many days they usually work per week. Finally, household
members were asked, on average, how many hours they usually worked per day in the past year.
For each individual, hours worked is the product of the months worked in the past year, weeks
worked per month, days worked per week, and hours worked per day. The total hours worked
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Table 3.2: Treatment Effects on Labor Supply and Earning (Mabian/Muchuan)
PSM PSM-DD DD DDD
Wage Income 5,598*** 7,145*** 4,669** 6,261***
Total Hours Worked 925** 1,610** 890*** 1228**
# of Earners 0.30** 0.54** 0.00 0.37***
# of Jobs 0.44** 0.96*** 0.38*** 0.57**
Controls Yes Yes
Village FE Yes Yes
Sample Size 883 883 1,151 1,151
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
is the sum of hours worked for each individual in the household. The second row of Table 3.2
presents the treatment effect on total hours worked. The result indicates that the Labor Income
Reward Plan increases the intensive labor supply significantly. Namely, program participation in-
creases total hours worked. More importantly, the magnitude and significance are consistent across
the regressions. The magnitude of the effect ranges from 925 hours to 1,228 hours per year (or 77
hours to 102 hours per month) per household. The results from the PSM estimation are slightly
smaller than the ones from the PSM-DD estimation. This suggests that there exists a potential un-
addressed bias in the PSM estimation. However, it tends to bias the result downward. Therefore,
this should not be a concern. The results from the DDD estimation are larger than their counter-
parts in the DD estimation, which is expected since the DD estimation yields ATE. The size of the
effect falls between the estimates from the PSM estimation and the PSM-DD estimation. Noticed
that the differences between the estimates from different regressions are moving in identical direc-
tions as they did in terms of extensive labor supply, I consider this evidence that is consistent with
the findings in extensive labor supply and, therefore, convincing.
49
3.4.4 Impacts on Earning
An income is considered to be wage income if it is earned via either employment and self-
employment, including part-time and freelance jobs. The income that is earned via farming and
business is not included since they are documented on the household-level. The total earning is
the sum of the earning of each individual in the household. Earning is particularly important since
the EITC incentivizes households directly through earning (instead of employment or working
hours). The first row of Table 3.2 presents the treatment effects on household earning. The result
indicates that the Labor Income Reward Plan has a positive and significant impact on household
earning. More importantly, the magnitude and the significance of the estimates are consistent
across the regressions. The size of the effect ranges from 5,598 RMB to 7,145 RMB per year (or
466 RMB to 595 RMB per month) per household. Again, the results from the PSM estimation
are slightly smaller than the ones from the PSM-DD estimation. The estimate from the DDD
estimation falls between the estimates from the PSM estimation and the PSM-DD estimation. The
differences between the estimates from different regressions move in identical directions as they
did in terms of extensive and intensive labor supply. Therefore, this result is consistent with the
previous findings.
3.4.5 Impacts on Production Type
It is important to examine how households would change their production types for two rea-
sons. First, the Labor Income Reward Plan that was offered to the households contains components
that reward through both employment and farming. This gives me a unique opportunity to better
understand how households determine and organize production when facing economic incentives.
Second, Mabian/Muchuan Experiment is the first EITC experiment that was conducted in China
with a focus on rural populations where farming is a major source of income. There are several
reasons to expect that the rural population would react differently (with or without the farming
reward). For instance, the employment opportunity in rural areas may not be as abundant as it is
in urban areas. Thus, rural households might find it difficult to increase earning via additional em-
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ployment. Table B.8 presents the treatment effects on production type. The first three outcomes in
the table are indicators that identify whether a household engages in crop farming only, husbandry
only, or both. The fourth row is an indicator that equals one if a household produces more than one
type of farm product. The last four rows are indicators that equal to one if a household engages in
food-crop farming, cash-crop farming, forestry, or husbandry. The result indicates no significant
impact on household production. Food-crop is defined as farm products that are grown for food
consumption. Cash-crop is defined as farm products that are grown for their economic values.
Yield is the reported market value of the farm products. Profit is the market sales revenue less the
cost of the input. There is some evidence that suggests that program participation increases house-
holds’ engagements in food-crop farming, forestry, and husbandry. In addition, households tend
to diversify their farming products. However, these findings are inconsistent across regressions in
terms of either magnitudes and significance. This implies that households reacted to the program
primarily by increasing earning via employment. Moreover, this is consistent with the administra-
tive record in which 80% of the reward was collected via the EITC component. There are three
possible explanations of why households prefer employment rather than farming. First, expanding
farming production might be particularly difficult due the constrains such as labor, farmlands, and
funds. The subsidy rate of the kick-starter fund may not be high enough to lift the households over
the barrier. Second, since it takes a significant amount of time for the household to profit from the
yield compared with employment, the liquidity constraints might have prevented the households
from expanding farm productions. Finally, households might be concerned about the risk of en-
gaging in new farming activities without sufficient training and experience. Consequently, there
has been a little change in terms of yield and profit through farming (Table B.8).
3.4.6 Impacts on Individuals
Individual-level data allows me to examine outcomes that cannot be aggregated to the household-
level. The matching for the individual-level regressions is similar to the ones for the household-
level data. The only difference is that household-level outcomes were placed by individual-level
outcomes. Table B.6 shows that the Rubins’ B for the matching is 16.7, and the R is 0.97. There-
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fore, the two groups are sufficiently balanced after matching. In this section, I will first discuss
outcomes that had been covered before, including earning, employment, the number of jobs. Then,
I will discuss the treatment effects on work types. Finally, I will breakdown the total hours worked
and look at the treatment effects on each component.
The first three rows in Table B.9 presents the treatment effects on individual earning and em-
ployment. The results indicate that the Labor Income Reward Plan has positive and significant
impacts on individual earning and the number of jobs. However, the estimates are less consistent
compared with the previous regressions. Particularly, the treatment effect on employment be-
comes small and insignificant. This change implies that program participation has heterogeneous
treatment effects across different types of households. Since the number of earners has increased
significantly in the household-level regression, the small and insignificant effect on individual em-
ployment indicates that the amount of people who became employed is roughly close to the ones
that became unemployed in general. However, the two groups of individuals are distributed dif-
ferently among households. On the one hand, individuals who became employed are more evenly
distributed among households so that the increase in earners would have a higher weight. On the
other hand, individuals who became unemployed are from fewer households, so that the decrease
in earners would have a lower weight. Thus, it shows an overall positive effect on the number
of earners in the household. Moreover, the increase in the number of jobs implies that there may
have been a substitution effect within households. This means that there are household members
who took up more jobs while other members from the same household quit working. Finally, The
fourth and the fifth row in Table B.9 presents the treatment effects on individual work type. An
individual has an employed job if he/she is hired by an employer. An individual is self-employed
if he/she is farming or doing business. The results indicate no significant change in work types.
The last five rows in Table B.9 present the treatment effects on individuals’ labor supply. In-
dividual labor supply is reflected by five measurements that describe different aspects. All of the
measurements are constructed based on the four questions in Section 3.4.3. The magnitude of the
effect on total months worked ranges from 0.47 to 0.62 months per year. The magnitude of the
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effect on total days worked ranges from 9 to 18 days per year. The magnitude of the effect on total
hours worked ranges from 157 to 179 hours per year. The size of the effect on the number of days
worked per month ranges from 1.29 to 1.87 days per month. The magnitudes and the significance
of the estimates are consistent across the regressions. However, evidence suggests that individuals’
number of hours worked per day has decreased.
3.4.7 Impacts on Expenditure
Previous results show that program participation significantly increases household earning.
Therefore, it is expected that household expenditure would also increase. However, the estimates
for household expenditures are mostly inconsistent across regressions in terms of either magnitudes
and significance (Table B.10). There are two potential explanations for this inconsistency. First,
the self-reported expenditures usually come with large measurement errors. Thus, the effects may
not be large enough to overcome the noise. Second, it is possible that the policy has heterogeneous
effects across different types of households. Therefore, a better way is to test the effects on different
quantiles. However, there is not enough statistical power to conduct meaningful comparisons. A
second-best solution is to compare the distributions between the two groups. Here, I employed
a method invented by Abadie (2002) to test for equality of the distributions, as well as first and
second order stochastic dominance.
Figure B.1 to Figure B.3 present the Cumulative Density Function (CDF) of changes in house-
hold expenditures. Namely, I calculated the changes in household expenditures between the
follow-up survey and the baseline survey for each household. Then, I plot the CDF of the changes
for both the treatment villages and the control villages. There exist notable differences in CDFs of
expenditures on food, utilities, sundries, transportation, and communication. Table B.10 presents
the results of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for differences in CDFs between the treatment villages
and the control villages. The results indicate that CDFs of changes in food expenditure, changes in
transportation expenditure, and changes in wedding/funeral expenditure are statistically different.
The distribution of changes in food expenditure and the distributions of changes in transportation
expenditure of the control villages dominate the treatment villages in both first and second order.
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The distribution of changes in wedding/funeral expenditure of the treatment villages dominates
the control villages in both first and second order. This suggests that the EITC may have increased
households’ expenditures on food and transportation and reduced the expenditure on wedding and
funeral.
3.5 Heterogeneous Treatment Effects
Table B.12 presents the heterogeneous treatment effects from the PSM-DD estimations. Here,
the sample is divided into subgroups based on different criteria. The high-income group is defined
as households with a total income higher than the median. The high-education group is defined as
households that have at least one member who has received secondary education. “Multiple able-
bodied” is defined as households with at least two individuals between 16 and 65 years old who
are able to work. “Multiple earners” means that households have at least two individuals who have
been working prior to the intervention. Results show that treatment effects vary across different
subgroups.
First, high education households responded similarly to low education households in terms of
labor supply. However, the effect on wage income among high education households is a lot larger
than the low-education group. This may imply that there exists a fundamental difference in abilities
to increase earning through employment if an individual holds a high school diploma or a higher
degree. This also implies that disadvantaged households benefit less from the program in terms of
earning.
Second, EITC has similar effects on labor supply among households with different amount
of able-bodied individuals, but the effect on wage income is a lot larger among households with
more than one able-bodied individual. This implies that the additional wage incomes are from very
different jobs. For example, households with single labor might be forced to choose part-time jobs
due to their time constraints, with which the wage is generally lower than full-time jobs. Similar
patterns can be observed among households with different earners. However, the differences are
less appealing.
Finally, heterogeneous treatment effects indicate that households that increase income through
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farming are mainly the ones that have more able-bodied persons but fewer earners prior to the
experiment. However, there is no increase in farm profit.
3.6 Summary
Mabian/Muchuan Experiment was conducted by China Household Finance and Survey (CHFS)
between 2017 and 2018. Eight villages participated in the experiment, of which four villages
were treated. The design employs a strong treatment intensity and a rigorous validation process.
This experiment is also the first EITC experiment that was conducted in China that focuses on
rural/minority populations.
Results show that Labor Income Reward Plan increases labor supply significantly on both ex-
tensive margin and intensive margin. Estimates show that the number of earners per household
has increased by 0.30 person (13% increase). The number of jobs per has increased by 0.38
(27% increase) job per household, and total hours worked has increased by 77 hours (41% in-
crease). Consequently, households’ monthly wage earnings (without the benefit) has increased by
466 RMB (63 USD) per month. These results are consistent across different methods in terms of
both magnitudes and significance. Moreover, the size of the effects is very similar to the findings
from the previous Wutongqiao Experiment. Distribution tests suggest that the EITC may have
increased household expenditure on food and transportation. However, it reduced expenditure on
weddings and funeral. Although I do not find a significant increase in household expenditure, the
results suggest that EITC has achieved its designed purpose, which is to increase the labor supply
and earning. Most importantly, the outcome of the experiment proves that EITC can work soundly
not just in urban areas in China but in rural areas as well.
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4. LEIBO EXPERIMENT
Leibo Experiment was conducted by China Household Finance and Survey (CHFS) between
2017 and 2018. The experiment was conducted in Leibo County. The county is located in Liang-
shan Yi Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan Province, China. Four villages (390 households) partic-
ipated in the experiment, of which two villages were treated. All registered poor households in the
treatment villages are offered with an EITC policy that contains two versions. Upon enrollment,
households will start receiving cash rewards every quarter (for consecutive four quarters). The
amount of the EITC depends on household earning in the last month. The offered EITC contains
three stages, including a phase-in, a plateau, and a phase-out. The amount of reward will first
increase with earning (phase-in rate=20% or 33% depending on the number of children). Then, it
reaches the maximum (300 RMB or 495 RMB depending on the number of children) and no longer
changes with the earning (plateau). Eventually, the reward will start decreasing as households earn
more and move into the phase-out stage (phase-out rate=10% ). Once the earning exceeds the
break-even point (5,500 RMB or 5,800 RMB depending on the number of children), the household
becomes ineligible for the program automatically. The other version is an EITC scheme but with
one phase-in stage and two plateau stages. The scheme starts with a basic amount of 100 RMB
(first plateau). Then, it enters a phase-in stage (phase-in rate=15%). The reward stops increasing
once it reaches 2,000 RMB, after which it enters the second plateau. Each claim needs supporting
materials such as proof of employment and income (see Appendix C.3). Finally, surveys were
conducted among households in both the treatment villages and the control villages prior to and
post to the intervention.
The design has several important and unique features. First, it implements a relatively strong
treatment intensity (18% of the monthly income). Second, it employs a comprehensive measure to
audit and validate each earning claim. Given that China has a large portion of self-employed jobs,
this validation process is particularly crucial for the experiment since it is relatively easier for the
self-employed to manipulate earnings compared to the employed with formal contracts. Third, the
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EITC that was offered to the households contains two different schemes. Households can choose
to receive EITC through one or both of the schemes. This feature offers a unique opportunity for
researchers to better understand households’ preferences of EITC schemes. Finally, the sample
focus on rural and minority populations.
Distribution analysis suggests that program participation has improved household labor supply
both on extensive and intensive margins. Namely, the result indicates the distributions of changes
in farm yield, changes in the number of earners, changes in the number of jobs, and changes in
total hours worked for the control villages stochastic dominates the treatment villages in both first
and second order. In addition, program participation improves household earning. The distribution
of changes in household wage income for the control villages stochastic dominates the treatment
villages in both first and second order. However, the regression analysis shows that the estimates
are inconsistent in terms of both magnitude and significance.
4.1 Experiment Design
The Leibo1 Experiment was conducted by China Households Finance Survey (CHFS) at South-
western University of Finance and Economics, China. The experiment started in June 2017 and
ended in January 2018. All registered poor households in the treatment villages were offered with
Labor Income Reward Plan. The program will allow households to receive a cash reward every
quarter.
4.1.1 Treatment
All registered poor households are offered with a policy bundle that contains two versions of
EITCs. The first version is an EITC that can be applied only through earning from employment.
The amount of the EITC depends on household earning in the last month. The offered EITC
contains three stages, including a phase-in, a plateau, and a phase-out. The amount of reward
will first increase with earning (phase-in rate=20% or 33% depending on the number of children).
Then, it reaches the maximum (300 RMB or 495 RMB depending on the number of children)
1Leibo is a county in China with an area twice as large as Phoenix in the US. The county has a population of around
240,000. The GDP per capita is 4,112 USD in 2018 (Leibo People’s Government, 2018).
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and no longer changes with the earning (plateau). Eventually, the reward will start decreasing as
households earn more and move into the phase-out stage (phase-out rate=10%). Once the earning
exceeds the break-even point (5,500 RMB or 5,800 RMB depending on the number of children),
the household becomes ineligible for the program automatically. The second version is an EITC
that can be applied through income either from crops farming, husbandry, or business. This version
is an EITC scheme but with one phase-in stage and two plateau stages. The scheme starts with a
basic amount of 100 RMB (first plateau). Then, it enters a phase-in stage (phase-in rate=15%). The
reward stops increasing once it reaches 2,000 RMB, after which it enters the second plateau and
continues forever. The EITC is distributed once every quarter. However, households are required
to report their earnings monthly. In addition, the maximum reward for each quarter is 1,000 RMB.
The maximum reward for two quarters combined is 4,000 RMB. When the calculated amount
exceeds the quarterly limit, the extra amount will be forwarded to the next quarter.
Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2 demonstrate how reward changes across earning and family struc-
tures. An eligible child is defined as any child below 16 years old or any child above 16 years old
but is currently enrolled in education (up to undergraduate equivalency). The earning from farming
and business is calculated as the sum of the sale revenue (instead of profit). Poultry and livestock
animals must be sold in the presence of the community staff to be valid for the reward.
4.1.2 Timeline
The experiment started with a baseline survey in June 2017. Then, the intervention started
immediately after the baseline survey. Households were required to report earnings as well as
provide supporting materials monthly during the intervention period. Community staff will review
the integrity and validity of the submitted materials. The reported earnings, supporting materials,
and the calculated rewards were audited and approved by the research team from CHFS quarterly,
after which the reward was distributed within the first ten days of each quarter. There are totally
four quarters in the intervention period. The intervention stopped at the end of September 2018.
Finally, a follow-up survey was conducted in November 2018. Figure 4.3 describes the major
phases of the Leibo Experiment.
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Figure 4.1: Labor Income Reward Plan in Leibo (Employment Reward)
4.1.3 Implementation
The implementation procedure is largely identical to Mabian/Muchuan Experiment. This sec-
tion will briefly discuss how the policy is implemented during the intervention period and how
households can access the program.
Preparation - Eligible households (all registered poor households in the treatment villages)
first applied for participation through CHFS prior to the intervention started. Then, information
sessions were carried out to inform the participated households about the program mechanism. A
team made of three to five local community staff was appointed to administer the program in each
treatment village. The staff was appointed by the local authorities. Each team participated in a
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Figure 4.2: Labor Income Reward Plan in Leibo (Farming and Business)
training session before the experiment. Finally, both information sessions and training sessions
were carried out by CHFS.
First-time applicant - Upon enrollment, households were required to sign the consent form
(Appendix C.2) and fill out the application form (Appendix C.2). Then, the forms were reviewed
and signed by the community staff.
Income report - Households are required to document and report the income every month
as well as providing the supporting materials (see Appendix C.3). All the required documents
need to be prepared properly and signed before the end of each month, then submitted to the
community staff within the first four days of each month. Upon acceptance, the community staff
60
Figure 4.3: Leibo Experiment Timeline (2017-2018)
will also examine the validity of the documents before sign and date. The community staff will
then calculate the earnings and upload the data to the audit system in the next five days.
Approval - CHFS will review all the materials and calculate the reward within the first ten
days in each quarter (including forwarding the excess amount). Then, results will be sent to the
community staff in each village. The community staff will have applicant households confirm the
amount of the reward and compile the forms (Appendix C.2) to be approved then submit them to
the township governments in the next five days. The reward for each household will be published
and open to the public for any inquiry for five days, after which the governments will seal the
approvals and submit them to the county’s office of poverty alleviation. Finally, the office will
directly transfer the reward to the bank account of the household applicants.
4.2 Survey Data
The survey sample was restricted to the villages that participated in the experiment. Two treat-
ment villages and two control villages participated in the experiment. Moshi and Shuikouba are
the treatment villages. Luohangou and Meiyi are the control villages. Households were randomly
selected for surveys. There were 390 households that were selected. This sample size is calculated
based on the power of 95%.
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Sample Size 388 252
Table 4.1 presents the data used in the analysis2. The data is collected via two household
surveys that were conducted before and after the intervention. The first survey was conducted prior
to the intervention in June 2017. The follow-up surveys were conducted after the intervention in
November 2018.
The first column in Table C.3 presents the household characteristics in the sample, including
labor supply, demographics, and socioeconomic status. 388 households have responded to the
baseline survey. It can be noticed that the average family size (4.84) tends to be larger compared
with the urban sample in Wutongqiao Experiment (2.91). Consequently, the average number of
able-bodied persons is higher (2.71). This is one of the main differences between households in
rural and urban areas. In addition, 64% of the households in the sample are registered poor house-
holds. The poverty rate is substantially larger than the sample in Mabian/Muchuan Experiment,
indicating that the households in Leibo sample are a lot poorer. Consequently, income and ex-
penditure are relatively lower. Finally, the self-reported expenditure tends to be larger than the
self-reported income, which is typical among household surveys.
There is a notable decline in sample size in the follow-up survey, which is primarily due to the
2A proportion of the households absented either baseline or follow-up surveys or both.
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no-shows. The main concern of this loss of sample is that it might introduce bias when estimating
the treatment effects. Two-sample tests show that households that did not show up during the
follow-up survey are not statistically different from households that attended both surveys with
two exceptions (Table C.2). Namely, households that missed the follow-up survey are less likely to
be registered poor households and less likely to perform farming. This is potentially problematic
since it means that the treatment households are over-represented in the follow-up survey, which
could bias the treatment effect upward. To address the problem, I restrict the sample to households
that participated in both surveys. However, the results are robust to this restriction.
4.3 Methodology
Given the fact that the treatment was assigned on the village-level and the fact that there were
only four villages, the design of the experiment is more of a quasi-experiment study rather than
a field experiment. Thus, a classic approach to identify the treatment effects is by using the
Difference-in-Differences (DD) estimation. The DD estimation imposes the identification assump-
tion that the changes in the control group will provide a good counterfactual for the changes in the
treatment group in the absence of the intervention, which is usually referred to as the “common
trend” assumption. However, there is no way to test this assumption due to the fact that there are
only two panels of survey data (Table 4.1). A second-best solution is to compare the characteristics
of the households in the treatment villages and the control villages. If there is no statistical differ-
ence in household characteristics (except for outcome variables such as income and labor supply)
between the treatment group and the control group, it can be argued that the identification assump-
tion would hold. Table C.3 shows the balance of covariates of households in the treatment villages
and the control villages. Unfortunately, results show that households in the treatment group are less
likely to be a registered poor household and more likely to be a minority household. The results
also show that households in the treatment villages are less likely to perform farming and tend to
have fewer hours worked and able-bodied persons but more farming profit. The differences are sta-
tistically significant. This means any effect that could be identified by the DD estimation is caused
by either the policy or the differences in household characteristics, or both, which will severely
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hamper the validity of the analysis. The last resort is to control for these differences and hope that
controlling for the observables will also resolve the bias caused by the unobservables. However,
it is generally considered that such an estimation is not reliable. To alleviate this problem, I will
use DD estimation with extensive controls and village fixed-effects to recover the treatment effect.
Meanwhile, I will estimate the treatment effect using two other methods, including Propensity-
score Matching (PSM) and DD estimation with Propensity-score Matching (PSM-DD). Given that
most outcome variables are household-level outcomes, I aggregated the data to household-level.
PSM is generally considered to be less-than-ideal primarily because the matching on observ-
ables does not guarantee the balances on unobservables. In order to alleviate this concern, I will
match on all of the outcomes variables as well as all of the household characteristics3. Then, I will
use additional tests to ensure the match is successful.
PSM-DD is a combination between PSM and DD estimation. The DD estimation resolves a
part of the potential bias (observable and unobservable) caused by the differences between the
treatment and the control group. Since PSM-DD should yield the same estimates if PSM success-
fully removes the bias, PSM-DD also serves as a check of PSM estimation. In order to make sure
any difference between the two estimations is not caused by the differences in matching methods, I
will use the exact same matching result from the PSM for PSM-DD. Finally, both PSM and PSM-
DD will be matching the eligible households (registered poor households in the treatment villages)
with other households since it comes with a larger pool of candidates that increases the chance of
successful matching.
It would be important to test for effects at different quantiles. However, there is not enough
statistical power to conduct meaningful comparisons. A second-best solution is to compare the
distributions between the two groups. In order to compare the distributions between the treatment
villages and the control villages, I first calculated the changes in outcomes between the follow-up
survey and the baseline survey for each household. Then, I plot the Cumulative Density Function
(CDF) of the changes for both the treatment villages and the control villages. Finally, I employed
3Here, I used the kernel method to match the observations instead of one-to-one since rigorous matching reduces
the chance of success drastically.
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a method invented by Abadie (2002) to test for equality of the distributions, as well as first and
second order stochastic dominance.
4.4 Results
The results from the Wutongqiao Experiment and Mabian/Muchuan Experiment show that the
Labor Income Reward Plan increases the number of earners in the household, hours worked, and
earning. Therefore, one should expect the results to be similar to the two experiments. In the
following section, I will discuss the impacts of the Labor Income Reward Plan on labor supply,
earning, and farming production.
4.4.1 Matching
Table B.5 shows the results of the matching. The households are matched based on both out-
come variables and household characteristics in the pre-period. Results indicate that the covariates
between the two groups are balanced after matching. In addition, there are two additional tests to
evaluate the overall matching success. Rubins’ B measures the absolute standardized difference of
the means of the linear index of the propensity score between the two groups. Rubin’s R measures
the ratio of the variances of the propensity-score index between the two groups. It is recommended
that a successful matching should have a B less than 25 and an R between 0.5 and 2 (Rubin, 2001).
The result shows that the Rubins’ B for the matching is 19.6, and the R is 1.17. Therefore, the two
groups are sufficiently balanced.
4.4.2 Impacts on Labor Participation
The number of earners and the number of jobs in the household reflect the extensive aspect
of the labor supply. An individual is defined as earner if he/she reported to having in the past
year. The number of earners is the total number of earners in the household. Similarly, the number
of jobs is the total number of jobs in the household. The second and the third row of Table 4.2
presents the treatment effects on extensive labor supply. The result indicates that the Labor Income
Reward Plan has positive and significant impacts on the number of earners. The magnitudes and
the significance of the estimates are largely consistent across the regressions. The magnitude
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of the effect on the number of earners ranges from 0.29 persons to 0.48 persons per household.
Although the estimated treatment effects on the number of jobs are positive, most of the estimates
are statistically insignificant.
Table 4.2: Treatment Effects on Labor Supply and Earning (Leibo)
PSM PSM-DD DD
Wage Income 3,745* 3,164 6,363***
# of Earners 0.29 0.45** 0.48***
# of Jobs 0.25 0.48 0.93***
Total Hours Worked 94 863 332
Farm -0.25 -0.02 0.03
Farm Yield -853 1,627 2,764*
Farm Profit -877 -605 1,524**
Controls Yes
Village FE Yes
Sample Size 252 252 252
Figure C.1 presents the CDFs of changes in the number of earners and the number of jobs.
There exist notable differences in both outcomes. Table C.1 presents the result of the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test for differences in CDFs between the treatment villages and the control villages. The
results indicate that CDFs of changes in the number of earners and the number of jobs are statisti-
cally different. The distribution of changes in the number of earners and the changes in the number
of jobs of the control villages dominate the treatment villages in both first and second order. This
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suggestive evidence is consistent with the previous causal analysis.
4.4.3 Impacts on Hours Worked
The total hours worked reflects the intensity aspect of the labor supply. The variable is cal-
culated based on four questions in the survey. Namely, household members were first asked how
many months they had been working in the past year (2016 or 2017). Then, household members
were asked, on average, how many weeks they had been working per month. Next, household
members were asked, on average, how many days they usually work per week. Finally, household
members were asked, on average, how many hours they usually worked per day in the past year.
For each individual, hours worked is the product of the months worked in the past year, weeks
worked per month, days worked per week, and hours worked per day. The total hours worked is
the sum of hours worked for each individual in the household. Table 4.2 presents the treatment
effect on total hours worked. The result indicates that the Labor Income Reward Plan increases
the intensive labor supply. Namely, program participation increases total hours worked. However,
none of the results are significant.
The left panel of Figure C.2 presents the CDFs of changes in total hours worked. There exist
notable differences at the left tail. The test results in Table C.1 indicates that CDFs of changes in
total hours worked are statistically different. The distribution of changes in total hours worked of
the control villages dominates the treatment villages in both first and second order. This suggests
that the EITC may have increased households’ intensive labor supply.
4.4.4 Impacts on Earning
An income is considered to be wage income if it is earned via either employment and self-
employment, including part-time and freelance jobs. The income that is earned via farming and
business is not included since they are documented on the household-level. The total earning is
the sum of the earning of each individual in the household. Earning is particularly important since
the EITC incentivizes households directly through earning (instead of employment or working
hours). The first row of Table 4.2 presents the treatment effects on household wage income. Most
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estimates are positive and with some significance. The size of the effect ranges from 3,164 RMB to
6,363 RMB per year (or 263 RMB to 530 RMB per month) per household. Given that the previous
finding suggests that program participation increases labor participation, this result is reasonable
and consistent with the previous findings.
The right panel of Figure C.2 presents the CDFs of changes in total wage income. The differ-
ences between the treatment villages and the control villages are quite appealing. The test results
in Table C.1 indicates that CDFs of changes in total wage income is statistically different. The dis-
tribution of changes in total wage income of the control villages dominates the treatment villages
in both first and second order. This suggests that the EITC may have increased households’ wage
income.
4.4.5 Impacts on Farm Production
It is important to examine how households would change their production type for two rea-
sons. First, households can choose to receive EITC either through earnings from employment,
business, farming, or multiple ways. This gives me a unique opportunity to better understand how
households decide productions. Second, Leibo Experiment was conducted in rural areas in China
where farming is a major source of income. There are several reasons to expect that the rural pop-
ulation would react differently compared with their counterparts in urban areas. For instance, the
employment opportunity in rural areas may not be as abundant as it is in urban areas. Thus, rural
households might find it difficult to increase earning via additional employment. The last three
rows in Table 4.2 presents the treatment effects on farm production. The first outcome is an indica-
tor that identifies whether a household engages in farming only. Farm yield is the reported market
value of the farm products, and farm profit is the market sales revenue less the cost of the input.
The inconsistent and insignificant results imply that the policy has no effect on farm production.
Figure C.3 presents the CDFs of changes in farm yield and changes in farm profit. There seem
to be some differences between the distributions of the treatment villages and the control villages,
especially the left tail of the farm yield. The test results in Table C.1 indicate that CDFs of changes
in farm yield is statistically different. The distribution of changes in farm yield of the control
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villages dominates the treatment villages in both first and second order. This suggests that the
EITC may have increased farm yield. However, the test results show that the CDFs of changes in
farm profit are not statistically different from each other. This suggests that households reacted to
the program primarily by increasing earning via employment.
4.5 Heterogeneous Treatment Effects
Table C.5 presents the heterogeneous treatment effects from the PSM-DD estimation. Here
the sample is divided into subgroups based on different criteria. The high-income group is de-
fined as households with a total income higher than the median. “High able-bodied” is defined
as households with more than two (median) individuals between 16 and 65 years old who are
able to work. “Multiple earners” means that households have more than two (median) individuals
who have been working prior to the intervention. Results show that treatment effects vary across
different subgroups. First, the treatment effects on labor supply and wage income are a lot larger
among high-income households compared with others. This implies the poor households generally
benefit less from the EITC compared with households with higher income. Households with more
income also tend to increase more in terms of farm yield and farm profit. Second, the treatment
effects on labor supply are a lot larger among households with fewer able-bodied persons. How-
ever, the households tend to earn less additional wage income compared with the ones with more
able-bodied persons. This implies that the additional wage incomes are from very different jobs.
For example, households with single labor might be forced to choose part-time jobs due to their
time constraints, with which the wage is generally lower than full-time jobs. Similar patterns can
be found between households with high and low earners, which is reasonable since the two cate-
gorizations are closely related. Finally, households with fewer able-bodied persons/earners tend to
increase more in farm yield and farm profit.
4.6 Summary
Leibo Experiment was conducted by China Household Finance and Survey (CHFS) between
2017 and 2018. Four villages (390 households) participated in the experiment, of which two
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villages were treated. The design employs a strong treatment intensity and a rigorous validation
process.
Results show that Labor Income Reward Plan increases labor supply on the extensive margin.
Estimates show that the number of earners per household has increased by 0.29 persons (12%
increase), and the number of jobs has increased by 0.25 (9% increase). Consequently, households’
monthly wage income (without the benefit) has increased by 263 RMB (38 USD) per month.
These results are mostly consistent across different methods. Moreover, the size of the effects
is very similar to the findings from the previous Wutongqiao Experiment and Mabian/Muchuan
Experiment. Distribution tests suggest that the EITC may have increased intensive labor supply
(total hours worked) and farm yield. The results suggest that EITC has achieved its designed
purpose, which is to increase the labor supply and earning.
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5. CONCLUSIONS
China currently has no in-work benefits nor social welfare programs such as the Earned Income
Tax Credits (EITC) in the United States. Yet, the literature and global evidence have suggested
EITC-type programs’ potentials on poverty alleviation and work incentives. More importantly, the
performance of current transfer programs is very unsatisfactory. An opportunity arises if China
can substantially increase cash transfer. Hence, a comprehensive evaluation through experiments
to evaluate an EITC-type program-a world-popular incentive-compatible cash transfer program
that has long been proven effective and successful, has important policy implications.
Between 2014 and 2018, China Household Finance and Survey (CHFS) at Southwestern Uni-
versity of Finance and Economics conducted a series of experiments that aim to test the effects
of an EITC-type policy-Labor Income Reward Plan. Each experiment has a different design and
population focus.
The designs have several important and unique features. First, the experiments implement a
relatively strong treatment intensity compared to the existing studies. Second, the designs em-
ploy a comprehensive measure to audit and validate each earning claim. Third, the EITC policies
were offered with either other supplemental components or different schemes, which provides
unique opportunities for researchers to better understand how EITC interacts with other typical
anti-poverty policies in China.
Wutongqiao Experiment shows that Labor Income Reward Plan significantly increases labor
supply significantly on both extensive margin and intensive margin. Namely, program participation
has increased the number of earners per household by 0.32, and total hours worked has increased
by 86 hours per month. It also significantly increases the household earning by 560 RMB (84
USD) per month. Finally, household expenditure has increased by 436 RMB (65 USD) per month.
The effects are persistent throughout the intervention period.
Mabian/Muchuan Experiment shows that Labor Income Reward Plan increases labor supply
significantly on both extensive margin and intensive margin. Estimates show that the number of
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earners per household has increased by 0.30 persons (13% increase). The number of jobs per
household has increased by 0.38 (27% increase) job per household. Total hours worked has in-
creased by 77 hours per month (41% increase). Consequently, households’ monthly wage income
(without the benefit) has increased by 466 RMB (63 USD) per month. These results are consistent
across different methods in terms of both magnitudes and significance. Moreover, distribution tests
suggest that the EITC may have increased household expenditure in food and transportation and
reduced expenditure in wedding and funeral.
Leibo Experiment shows that Labor Income Reward Plan increases labor supply on the ex-
tensive margin. Estimates show that the number of earners per household has increased by 0.29
persons (12% increase), and the number of jobs has increased by 0.25 (9% increase). Conse-
quently, households’ monthly wage income (without the benefit) has increased by 263 RMB (38
USD) per month. These results are mostly consistent across different methods. Moreover, distri-
bution tests suggest that the EITC may have increased intensive labor supply (total hours worked)
and farm yield.
Most importantly, three experiments yield similar results regardless of designs and methodolo-
gies (Table 5.1). Together, the EITC experiment series presents the first and unambiguously strong
evidence that EITC has worked and achieved its designed purpose in China. First, EITC increases
the labor supply both on the extensive and intensive margin. Second, EITC increases earning and
work well as an anti-poverty policy. Finally, EITC will increase household consumption, especially
in terms of food and education.
The dissertation yields important policy implications for governments and policymakers and
contributes to the literature that studies the effects of incentive-compatible transfer programs using
field experiments and non-experimental methods.
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Table 5.1: Results Comparison Across Experiments
Treatment Effects Wutongqiao Mabian/Muchuan Leibo
Bundle EITC EITC + Price Sub. + Kickstart EITCs
Wage Income 559 466 263
Ttl Hours worked 86 77 -
# of Earners 0.32 0.30 0.29
# of Jobs 0.26 0.38 0.25
Sample Size 259 1,151 388
In addition, Wutongqiao Experiment was funded by donations before March 2017, after which
the local government took it over and expended the program to all registered poor households in
their entire jurisdiction. Appendix A.1 includes a photograph of an identification plate outside the
enrolled household issued by the local ministry of civil affairs. Moreover, more local governments
have joined the experiment with various plans. In 2019, there are additional 9,000 households
newly enrolled in the program, and the total enrolled households have reached more than 72,000
(Table 5.2). The forthcoming evaluations and experiments studies about EITC in the future shall
continue to help researchers and policymakers deepen the understanding and make improvements
of EITC.
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Table 5.2: Current On-going Experimental Programs in China
District Start Households Enrolled
Leshan City
Wutongqiao Dist. Pilot Study (Completed) August, 2014 27
Experiment (Completed) November, 2015 103
Full Implementation (On-going) February, 2017 1,052
Mabian County Gantianba Village (Completed) April, 2017 64
Boxiang Village (Completed) April, 2017 122
Houchi Village (On-going) January, 2018 107
Muchuan County Qianguang Village (Completed) April, 2017 34
Ciwan Village (Completed) April, 2017 39
Full Implementation (On-going) January, 2018 68,000
Xiangcheng County, Ganzi Shagong Village (Completed) Septmber, 2017 127
(Minority Autonomous Pre-
fecture)
Shagong, Baiyi, Reda (Implemented) April, 2018 835
Leibo County, Liangshan Moshi Village (On-going) April, 2017 74
(Minority Autonomous Pre-
fecture)
Shuikouba Village (On-going) April, 2017 64
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Figure A.1: Household Monthly Hours Worked Distribution
Figure A.2: Household Monthly Earning Distribution
Figure A.3: Household Monthly Expenditure Distribution
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Figure A.4: Dynamic Treatment Effects on Number of Earners
Figure A.5: Dynamic Treatment Effects on Household Total Hours Worked
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Figure A.6: Dynamic Treatment Effects on Household Earning
Figure A.7: Dynamic Treatment Effects on Household Total Expenditure
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Figure A.8: Dynamic Treatment Effects on Household Total Expenditure (No Education)
Figure A.9: Treatment Effects on Household Total Expenditure (No Education)
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Figure A.10: Dynamic Treatment Effects on Food Expenditure
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Figure A.15: Previously Unemployed End Up with (Treatment vs. Control)
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Figure A.17: Previously Employed End Up with (Treatment vs. Control)
Figure A.18: Labor Income Reward Plan (The Pilot)
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Figure A.19: Labor Division among the Dual-income Families
Figure A.20: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects (Dual-income vs. Non-Dual)
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Figure A.21: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects (Phase-in vs. Plateau vs. Phase-out)
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A.3 Tables
Table A.1: Treatment Effects on Household Labor Supply (a) (The Pilot, OLS)
# of Earners Monthly Hours Worked Monthly Hours Worked
per Household Total Hours Worked for Primary Job for Secondary Job
treatment 0.336* 80.7** 105.1** 1.9
(0.11) (27.87) (50.69) (12.03)
N 53 53 53 53
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Standard errors in parentheses
Table presents the OLS estimates of the treatment effects on household labor supply using only the data post to the intervention in the pilot. Results show
that households significantly increased the household total labor supply through monthly hours worked for the primary job. This is potentially due to the
significant increase in the number of earners per household.
Table A.2: Treatment Effects on Household Labor Supply (b) (The Pilot, OLS)
Primary Job Secondary Job
Weeks Worked Days Worked Hours Worked Weeks Worked Days Worked Hours Worked
treatment 1.68** 1.98** 3.10* -0.12 -0.31 -0.20
(0.45) (0.72) (1.10) (0.12) (0.20) (0.28)
N 53 53 53 53 53 53
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Standard errors in parentheses
Table presents the OLS estimates of the treatment effects on household labor supply using only the data post to the intervention in the pilot. Results show
that households significantly increased their weeks worked per month, days worked per week, and hours worked per day for the primary job.
Table A.3: Treatment Effects on Household Earning (The Pilot, OLS)
Monthly Earning Monthly Earning
for Primary Job for Secondary Job Farming Profit Business Profit
treatment 189.50 66.67* -31.25 0.00
(317.68) (30.63) (38.71) (218.45)
N 53 53 53 53
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Standard errors in parentheses
Table presents the OLS estimates of the treatment effects on household earning using only the data post to the intervention in the pilot. Results show that
households significantly increased their earnings from the secondary job.
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Table A.4: Balance of Covariate (The Pilot, Treatment vs. Control)
Overall Treatment Control T-C p-value
Family Size 3.29 3.52 3.09 0.42 0.204
(0.17) (0.26) (0.21) (0.33)
Number of Children 0.46 0.52 0.41 0.11 0.530
(0.09) (0.15) (0.10) (0.18)
Number of Seniors 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.00 0.994
(0.08) (0.11) (0.11) (0.16)
Household has Handicapped 0.02 0.00 0.03 -0.03 0.362
(0.02) (0.00) (0.03) (0.03)
Number of Earners 1.32 1.26 1.38 -0.12 0.560
(0.10) (0.13) (0.15) (0.20)
Weeks Worked Per Month 4.93 4.74 5.09 -0.35 0.664
(0.40) (0.52) (0.60) (0.81)
Days Worked Per Weeks 7.63 7.29 7.90 -0.61 0.618
(0.60) (0.76) (0.92) (01.22)
Hours Worked Per Day 10.67 10.41 10.91 -0.50 0.774
(0.86) (01.38) (01.09) (01.74)
Household is Farming 0.03 0.00 0.06 -0.06 0.192
(0.02) (0.00) (0.04) (0.05)
Household is Doing Business 0.31 0.37 0.25 0.12 0.325
(0.06) (0.09) (0.10) (0.12)
Total Wage 1175.89 1210.48 1146.71 63.76 0.849
(164.91) (251.84) (221.07) (353.80)
Total Pension 781.70 918.17 666.36 251.61 0.424
(155.34) (247.67) (197.24) (312.76)
Total Earning Income 1507.83 1543.95 1477.34 66.61 0.827
(150.14) (233.92) (197.43) (303.88)
Earning Per Capita 469.15 430.87 501.45 -70.57 0.358
(37.93) (44.85) (58.86) (76.22)
Sundries 1492.11 1716.11 1303.12 412.98 0.071
(114.30) (194.53) (125.59) (224.89)
Education 279.32 413.70 174.37 229.32 0.114
(72.22) (137.03) (62.66) (143.04)
Total Expenditure 2493.42 3062.11 2013.54 1048.51 0.023
(233.30) (438.75) (187.93) (451.51)
Sample Size 59 27 32
Table presents the balance of covariates between the treatment group and the control group in the pilot sample. The first three columns
present the means and the standard errors (in parentheses) for the whole sample, the treatment group, and the control group during the
pre-intervention period. The fourth column presents the mean difference between the treatment group and the control group. The fifth
column presents the p-value of the two-sample t-test. Labor supply (e.g., weeks worked per month) is calculated based on the jobs that
provide primary earnings. There is no statistical difference between the two groups in terms of demographics, labor supply, earning, and
expenditure. The randomization is successful. There is no extremely poor household in the pilot sample. The expenditure on food is not
available in the pilot surveys.
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Table A.5: Balance of Covariate (The Experiment, Always Answered vs. Others)
Overall Attritted Non-Attritted A-N p-value
Family Size 2.91 3.00 2.84 0.16 0.270
(0.07) (0.12) (0.09) (0.15)
Number of Children 0.36 0.34 0.38 -0.04 0.575
(0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.08)
Number of Seniors 0.23 0.29 0.18 0.11 0.108
(0.03) (0.06) (0.04) (0.07)
Household has Handicapped 0.04 0.01 0.06 -0.05 0.088
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03)
Extreme Poverty 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.469
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Number of Earners 1.12 1.15 1.11 -0.04 0.709
(0.06) (0.10) (0.06) (0.12)
Weeks Worked Per Month 3.89 3.98 3.81 0.17 0.664
(0.21) (0.35) (0.24) (0.41)
Days Worked Per Weeks 6.48 6.40 6.38 0.21 0.752
(0.34) (0.59) (0.40) (0.68)
Hours Worked Per Day 9.03 9.29 8.80 0.49 0.632
(0.51) (0.91) (0.55) (01.03)
Household is Farming 0.11 0.13 0.10 0.04 0.388
(0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05)
Household is Doing Business 0.16 0.13 0.18 0.05 0.384
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Total Wage 701.96 656.77 755.28 98.51 0.514
(75.04) (83.06) (131.34) (150.81)
Total Pension 246.80 309.62 193.55 116.07 0.257
(50.87) (76.50) (67.93) (102.00)
Total Earning Income 820.25 871.85 776.52 95.33 0.520
(74.17) (131.33) (80.34) (149.08)
Earning Per Capita 271.57 274.87 268.76 06.11 0.892
(22.26) (37.04) (26.73) (44.79)
Food 970.48 1034.50 916.21 118.28 0.143
(40.21) (65.19) (49.34) (80.46)
Sundries 55.37 58.51 53.09 05.42 0.512
(04.11) (07.07) (04.68) (08.26)
Education 79.79 73.65 85.00 -11.35 0.685
(13.89) (18.49) (20.40) (27.94)
Total Expenditure 1454.67 1498.24 1436.22 62.02 0.607
(60.02) (80.24) (80.24) (120.68)
Sample Size 189 95 94
Table presents the balance of covariates of the experiment sample between households that answered all of the surveys and other house-
holds. The first three columns present the means and the standard errors (in parentheses) for the whole sample, households that did not
respond to the survey at least once, and households that responded to all of the surveys during the pre-intervention period. The fourth
column presents the mean difference between the last two groups. The fifth column presents the p-values of the two-sample t-test. All
covariates are aggregated to the household-level. Wage income only includes earnings from employment. Earning includes earnings from
employment, self-employment, farming, and business. Labor supply (e.g., weeks worked per month) is calculated based on the jobs that
provide primary earnings. The statistics in this table imply that there is no statistical difference between households that did not respond
to the survey at least once and households that responded to all of the surveys during the pre-intervention period.
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Table A.6: Balance of Covariate (The Experiment, Treatment vs. Control)
Overall Treatment Control T-C p-value
Family Size 2.91 2.90 2.92 -0.02 0.890
(0.07) (0.10) (0.11) (0.15)
Number of Children 0.36 0.37 0.35 0.02 0.825
(0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.08)
Number of Seniors 0.23 0.18 0.29 -0.10 0.143
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07)
Household has Handicapped 0.04 0.04 0.03 -0.01 0.582
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Extreme Poverty 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.637
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Number of Earners 1.12 1.03 1.23 -0.20 0.066
(0.05) (0.07) (0.09) (0.11)
Weeks Worked Per Month 3.89 3.39 4.45 -0.11 0.009
(0.21) (0.23) (0.34) (0.41)
Days Worked Per Weeks 6.48 5.75 7.31 -1.56 0.020
(0.34) (0.39) (0.56) (0.67)
Hours Worked Per Day 9.03 7.62 10.62 -2.99 0.003
(0.51) (0.52) (0.89) (01.00)
Household is Farming 0.11 0.14 0.09 0.05 0.295
(0.02) (0.00) (0.03) (0.05)
Household is Doing Business 0.16 0.18 0.13 0.05 0.320
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Total Wage Income 701.96 498.15 932.64 434.49 0.003
(75.04) (67.88) (136.81) (147.45)
Total Pension 246.79 190.61 310.39 -119.78 0.240
(50.86) (60.71) (83.75) (101.82)
Total Earning 820.25 660.07 1001.55 -341.47 0.021
(74.17) (66.89) (136.89) (146.96)
Earning Per Capita 271.56 228.42 320.39 -91.96 0.038
(22.26) (22.31) (39.70) (44.22)
Food 970.48 904.46 1045.20 -140.74 0.080
(40.21) (50.53) (63.25) (80.15)
Sundries 55.57 57.98 52.85 05.13 0.534
(04.11) (05.53) (06.14) (08.25)
Education 79.79 93.25 64.56 28.69 0.304
(13.89) (20.85) (17.88) (27.83)
Total Expenditure 1464.67 1424.07 1510.63 -86.55 0.473
(60.02) (80.28) (90.32) (120.42)
Sample Size 194 103 91
Table presents the balance of covariates of the experiment sample between the actual treatment group and the actual control group. The
first three columns present the means and the standard errors (in parentheses) for the whole sample, the actual treatment group, and the
actual control group during the pre-intervention period. The fourth column presents the mean difference between the last two groups.
The fifth column presents the p-value of the two-sample t-test. All covariates are aggregated to the household-level. Wage income only
includes earnings from employment. Earning includes earnings from employment, self-employment, farming, and business. Labor supply
(e.g., weeks worked per month) is calculated based on the jobs that provide primary earnings. The statistics in this table implies potential
selection bias.
96
Table A.7: Balance of Covariate (Instrument, Treatment vs. Control)
Overall Treatment Control T-C p-value
Total Wage 661.29 571.26 752.27 -181.00 0.219
(73.44) (78.59) (124.23) (146.67)
Total Pension 253.32 205.20 301.96 -96.76 0.354
(52.13) (301.96) (81.21) (104.30)
Total Earning 782.70 737.35 828.54 -91.20 0.533
(72.86) (76.53) (124.68) (145.95)
Earning Per Capita 254.86 253.06 256.68 -03.62 0.931
(20.94) (25.59) (33.37) (42.00)
Number of Earners 01.11 01.08 01.14 -0.06 0.564
(0.05) (0.07) (0.08) (0.11)
Weeks Worked Per Month 03.79 03.51 04.07 -0.56 0.181
(0.20) (0.24) (0.34) (0.42)
Days Worked Per Weeks 06.33 05.94 06.73 -0.79 0.254
(0.34) (0.41) (0.55) (0.69)
Hours Worked Per Day 08.86 08.06 09.68 -01.62 0.140
(0.55) (0.58) (0.92) (01.09)
Household is Farming 0.12 0.14 0.10 0.04 0.381
(0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05)
Household is Doing Business 0.29 02.96 02.88 0.09 0.569
(0.07) (0.11) (0.10) (0.15)
Family Size 02.92 02.97 02.88 0.09 0.569
(0.07) (0.11) (0.10) (0.15)
Number of Children 0.36 0.37 0.35 0.02 0.827
(0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.08)
Number of Seniors 0.23 0.19 0.28 -0.09 0.215
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07)
Household has Handicapped 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.256
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03)
Extreme Poverty 0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.569
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Food 954.62 917.05 992.59 -75.54 0.346
(39.95) (54.01) (58.95) (79.92)
Sundries 55.70 59.92 51.43 8.48 0.313
(04.19) (05.81) (06.04) (08.38)
Education 77.67 97.00 58.14 38.86 0.165
(13.95) (22.38) (16.49) (27.87)
Total Expenditure 1446.90 1458.68 1435.00 23.69 0.846
(60.64) (86.00) (85.97) (121.60)
Sample Size 189 95 94
Table presents the balance of covariates of the experiment sample across initial treatment status. The first three columns present the
means and the standard errors (in parentheses) for the whole sample, the initial treatment group, and the initial control group during the
pre-intervention period. The fourth column presents the mean difference between the treatment group and the control group. The fifth
column presents the p-value of the two-sample t-test. All covariates are aggregated to the household-level. Wage income only includes
earnings from employment. Earning includes earnings from employment, self-employment, farming, and business. Labor supply (e.g.,
weeks worked per month) is calculated based on the jobs that provide primary earnings. The statistics in this table implies that there is
no statistical difference between the households that were initially in the treatment group and the those that were initially in the control
group. The initial randomization is successful.
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Table A.8: First-stage Regression (Household-level)
treated Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P> |t|
treated0 0.8637 0.0386 22.4000 0.0000
t2 0.1040 0.0333 3.1300 0.0020
t3 0.1008 0.0332 3.0400 0.0030
t4 0.0979 0.0324 3.0300 0.0030
t5 0.1005 0.0333 3.0200 0.0030
t6 0.1045 0.0342 3.0600 0.0030
_cons -0.0035 0.0145 -0.2400 0.8100
N 897 F-statisic = 416.53
# of Households 189 Prob>F = 0.0000
Table presents the estimation result of the first-stage regression using household-level data. Here,
the dependent variable (treated) is the interaction of the treatment group indicator and the post-
treatment indicator that equals one if the panel is observed post to the intervention. The main
independent variable (treated0) is the instrument, which is the interaction of the initial treatment
group indicator and the post-treatment indicator. Variables t2 to t6 are the time dummies. t1
is dropped. The first-stage regression shows the F-statistic is 416.53, which is relatively large
compared to the 10 in “Rule of Thumb” by Staiger and Stock (1994). This implies the instrument
predicts the endogenous variable well.







Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic (Underidentification test) 96.396
Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic (Weak indentification test) 376.259
Table presents the estimation result of the first-stage regressions using household-level data. Here,
the dependent variables (treat_t2 to treat_t6) are the interactions of Treatmenti and It(time = t).
Treatmenti is a dummy variable that equals one if household i is actually assigned to the treatment
group. It(time = t) is a dummy variable that equals one if the data is observed in time t. With
regressions in the first-stage estimation, I use two additional tests for weak instruments, which
are more appropriate when there are multiple endogenous variables. Both tests show that the
instruments predict the endogenous variables well in the new first-stage estimation. Please see
Kleibergen and Paap (2006) and Stock and Yogo (2002) for discussion.
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Table A.10: Treatment Effects on Household Labor Supply (a) (The Experiment, IV)
# of Earners Monthly Hours Worked Monthly Hours Worked
per Household Total Hours Worked for Primary Job for Secondary Job
treated 0.329*** 80.7*** 86.0*** -5.3
(0.11) (27.87) (27.54) (4.77)
Household FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
# of Households 174 174 174 174
N 882 882 882 882
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Standard errors in parentheses
Table presents the IV estimates of the treatment effects on household labor supply using data prior and post to the intervention in the
experiment. Results show that households significantly increased the number of earners, total hours worked, and monthly hours worked
for the primary job.
Table A.11: Treatment Effects on Household Labor Supply (b) (The Experiment, IV)
Primary Job Secondary Job
Weeks Worked Days Worked Hours Worked Weeks Worked Days Worked Hours Worked
treated 1.68*** 1.98*** 3.10*** -0.12 -0.31 -0.20
(0.45) (0.72) (1.10) (0.12) (0.20) (0.28)
Household FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
# of Households 174 174 174 174 174 174
N 882 882 882 882 882 882
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Standard errors in parentheses
Table presents the IV estimates of the treatment effects on household labor supply using data prior and post to the intervention in the experiment. Results
show that households significantly increased their weeks worked per month, days worked per week, and hours worked per day for the primary job.
Table A.12: Treatment Effects on Household Earning (The Experiment, IV)
Monthly Earning Monthly Earning
for Primary Job for Secondary Job Farming Profit Business Profit
treated 559.77*** -14.34 0.33 23.23
(174.83) (13.22) (23.11) (59.74)
Household FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
# of Households 174 174 174 174
N 882 882 882 882
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Standard errors in parentheses
Table presents the IV estimates of the treatment effects on household earning using data prior and post to the intervention in the experiment. Results show
that households significantly increased their earnings from the primary job.
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Table A.13: Treatment Effects on Household Expenditure (a) (The Experiment, IV)
Food Eatout Utility Sundries Transportation
treated 158.95** -12.61 13.00 -2.41 48.06
(78.43) (37.46) (11.29) (8.66) (33.07)
Household FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
# of Households 174 174 174 174 174
N 882 882 882 882 882
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Standard errors in parentheses
Table presents the IV estimates of the treatment effects on household expenditure using data prior and post to the intervention in the
experiment. Results show that households significantly increased expenditure on food.
Table A.14: Treatment Effects on Household Expenditure (b) (The Experiment, IV)
Total Exp. Total Exp.
Education Communication Clothing (with edu.) (without edu.)
treated 226.20** 10.53 -5.63 436.07*** 209.87**
(101.78) (9.39) (17.29) (138.74) (109.59)
Household FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
# of Households 174 174 174 174 174
N 882 882 882 882 882
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Standard errors in parentheses
Table presents the IV estimates of the treatment effects on household expenditure using data prior and post to the intervention in the
experiment. Results show that households significantly increase expenditure on education. Total expenditure increased significantly with
or without considering expenditure on education.
Table A.15: Treatment Effects on Health (The Experiment, IV)
Discomfort Fever Pain Diarrhea Cough Palpitation
treated -0.023 -0.019* 0.000 0.006 -0.005 -0.023*
(0.050) (0.010) (0.038) (0.005) (0.017) (0.012)
Individual FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
# of Individual 531 531 531 531 531 531
N 2,562 2,562 2,562 2,562 2,562 2,562
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Standard errors in parentheses
Table presents the IV estimates of the treatment effects on individual health using data prior and post to the intervention in the experiment.


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A.18: First-stage Regression (Individual-level)
treated Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P> |t|
treated0 0.871684 0.038559 22.40 0.000
t2 0.092944 0.033260 3.13 0.002
t3 0.092605 0.033186 3.04 0.003
t4 0.090101 0.032353 3.03 0.003
t5 0.091293 0.033270 3.02 0.003
t6 0.097394 0.034150 3.06 0.003
_cons -0.004983 0.014073 -0.35 0.724
N 2628 F-statisic = 434.71
# of Individual 597 Prob>F = 0.0000
Table presents the estimation result of the first-stage regression using the individual-level data.
Here, the dependent variable (treated) is the interaction of the treatment group indicator and the
post-treatment indicator that equals one if the panel is observed post to the intervention. The main
independent variable (treated0) is the instrument, which is the interaction of the initial treatment
group indicator and the post-treatment indicator. Variables t2 to t6 are the time dummies. t1
is dropped. The first-stage regression shows the F-statistic is 434.71, which is relatively large
compared to the 10 in “Rule of Thumb” by Staiger and Stock (1994). This implies the instrument
predicts the endogenous variable well.







Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic (Underidentification test) 96.396
Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic (Weak indentification test) 376.259
Table presents the estimation result of the first-stage regressions using individual-level data. Here,
the dependent variables (treat_t2 to treat_t6) are the interactions of Treatmenti and It(time = t).
Treatmenti is a dummy variable that equals one if individual i is actually assigned to the treatment
group. It(time = t) is a dummy variable that equals one if the data is observed in time t. With
regressions in the first-stage estimation, I use two additional tests for weak instruments, which
are more appropriate when there are multiple endogenous variables. Both tests show that the
instruments predict the endogenous variables well in the first-stage estimation. See Kleibergen and
Paap (2006) and Stock and Yogo (2002) for discussion.
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Table A.20: Dynamic Treatment Effects on Health (The Experiment, IV)
Discomfort Fever Pain Diarrhea Cough Palpitation
treat_t2 0.008 -0.02 -0.003 0.005 -0.005 -0.03*
(0.056) (0.015) (0.042) (0.005) (0.020) (0.016)
treat_t3 -0.059 -0.022 -0.009 0.007 0.020 -0.014
(0.066) (0.016) (0.043) (0.006) (0.024) (0.020)
treat_t4 0.002 -0.021 0.026 0.008 -0.001 -0.039*
(0.067) (0.014) (0.053) (0.006) (0.024) (0.022)
treat_t5 -0.041 -0.021 0.023 0.008 -0.008 -0.015
(0.067) (0.016) (0.05) (0.006) (0.028) (0.015)
treat_t6 -0.047 -0.006 -0.035 0 .000 -0.037 -0.009
(0.069) (0.012) (0.046) (0.008) (0.034) (0.018)
Individual FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
# of Individual 531 531 531 531 531 531
N 2562 2562 2562 2562 2562 2562
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Standard errors in parentheses
Table presents the IV estimates of the dynamic treatment effects on individual health outcomes using data prior and post to the
intervention in the experiment.
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Table A.21: Correlation Matrices (Income Source vs. Scheme Phase)
t=1 Phase-in Plateau Phase-out t=4 Phase-in Plateau Phase-out
No Income 0.2233* -0.1736* -0.1214* No Income 0.3004* -0.1961* -0.1687*
Single Income 0.0380 0.0719 -0.1265* Single Income 0.1091 0.1369 -0.2886*
Dual Income -0.2395* 0.0726 0.2486* Dual Income -0.3298* -0.0110 0.4322*
t=2 Phase-in Plateau Phase-out t=5 Phase-in Plateau Phase-out
No Income 0.2142* -0.1675* -0.1060 No Income 0.3395* -0.1938* -0.2175*
Single Income 0.0975 0.0751 -0.2071* Single Income 0.1138 0.0292 -0.1610*
Dual Income -0.2891* 0.0505 0.3274* Dual Income -0.3979* 0.1209 0.3533*
t=3 Phase-in Plateau Phase-out t=6 Phase-in Plateau Phase-out
No Income 0.2545* -0.1677* -0.1469* No Income 0.3932* -0.2397* -0.2516*
Single Income 0.1979* -0.0262 -0.2273* Single Income 0.0846 0.1175 -0.2179*
Dual Income -0.3743* 0.1355 0.3368* Dual Income -0.4507* 0.0880 0.4694*
Table presents the matrices of correlations between types of income structures (no-income, single-income, and dual-income)
and the location in scheme phases (phase-in, plateau, and phase-out). Significance with the level above 10% is marked with
asterisks. The table shows that dual-income households always tend to end up in the phase-out stage regardless of time periods.
This explains why the phase-out families have a larger treatment effect.
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Table A.22: Balance of Covariate (Child Age Group, Treatment vs. Control)
Age Group Overall Treatment Control T-C p-value
6 to 12 (Elementary) 0.21 0.21 0.22 -0.01 0.876
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07)
12 to 15 (Junior High) 0.09 0.06 0.13 -0.07 0.170
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05)
15 to 18 (Senior High) 0.19 0.21 0.17 0.04 0.587
(0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07)
18 to 22 (College) (0.34 0.40 0.27 0.13 0.121
(0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08)
Sample Size 138 78 60
Table presents the balance of covariates of the experiment sample across initial treatment status. Each row presents
the average number of children that fall in a particular age group. The first three columns present the means and the
standard errors (in the parenthesis) for the whole sample, the initial treatment group, and the initial control group during
the pre-intervention period. The fourth column presents the mean difference between the last two groups. The fifth
column presents the p-value of the two-sample t-test. The table shows that there are more households in the treatment
group who have members in the 18-22 age group even though the difference is not statistically significant. This
indicates that the treatment effect on education expenditure might have been driven by the fact that more households
in the treatment group happen to have more students in colleges.
Table A.23: Treatment Effects on Education Expenditure (College vs. Non-College)
Education Expenditure Education Expenditure











Household FE Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes
# of Households 174 174
N 882 882
Table presents the IV estimates of the dynamic treatment effects on household education expenditure using data prior
and post to the intervention in the experiment. Results show that college households have effects that are similar to the
previous result, while the other households do not show any effect. This indicates that it is households with college
students that are driving the overall effect. The overall effect is not driven by the fact that more households in the
treatment group happen to have more students in colleges.
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Table A.24: Treatment Effects on Employment Type
Unemployed Employed Self-employed
treated -0.096** 0.051 0.045
(0.038) (0.033) (0.038)
Individual FE Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes
# of Individual 531 531 531
N 2562 2562 2562
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Standard errors in parentheses
Table presents the IV estimates of the treatment effects on employment type using data prior and post to the intervention in the
experiment. Results show that the number of unemployed individuals decreased significantly.
Table A.25: Treatment Effects by Income Structures and Scheme Phases
Dual-income Non-dual Phase-in Plateau Phase-out
Monthly Hours Worked 163.38*** 28.45 67.07** 44.98 143.83*
(56.22) (28.53) (33.53) (59.07) (86.64)
Monthly Earning 953.88** 422.11** 462.75** 384.84 513.52
(469.10) (187.74) (189.88) (417.05) (568.26)
Monthly Total Exp. 934.23*** 277.05* 306.41** 647.23* 913.30*
(266.65) (163.79) (151.53) (383.28) (552.37)
Household FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
# of Households 174 174 174 174 174
N 882 882 882 882 882
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Standard errors in parentheses
Table presents the IV sub-group estimates of the treatment effects on major outcomes using data prior and post to the intervention in the
experiment. Results indicate that dual-income families have larger effects compared with the others, and households that were initially in
the phase-out range prior to the intervention have larger effects compared with the others.
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A.4 Application Procedure
Households are required to report their employment status and earnings monthly with sup-
porting materials. A review committee will verify the validity of the materials before issuing the
rewards. In addition, an inspection team will contact the employers to verify the reported earning
before the applications were approved.
First-time applicants - Upon the first-time application, local community committee staffs will
visit the eligible households in person and deliver the forms to be prepared, including the consent
form and the confidentiality form. Households will be asked to provide their household registers,
IDs, and the bank account of the heads before completing the forms. The staff will be assisting the
household heads to fill out the forms. For heads who are illiterate, the forms will be completed by
narrations and filled by the staff.
Submission - Households are required to report their employment status and earnings of the
last month during the first week of each month. Specifically, members in the enrolled households
are required to submit earning certificates or payroll records that are signed and sealed by their em-
ployers. Less formal jobs such as part-time jobs are required to provide payment certificates which
indicate hours worked and payments, signed and sealed by the employers, too. The certificate tem-
plates are designed and provided by the review committee (See Appendix A.5). Households that
perform farming or own business are required to submit sales records or tax certificates, indicating
daily costs and quantities along with profits. The record templates are also designed and pro-
vided by the review committee. When the materials are ready, the staff from the local community
committees will visit the households and collect the documents.
Preliminary check - After the submission, the staff from the local community committees
will begin checking the integrity and the validity of the materials and see if the numbers make
sense. This process is to be completed in three workdays. Specifically, first, they will check if
the households have complete their submissions. Then, check if the submitted materials are valid,
such as if the documents are signed and sealed by the employers and possibilities to forge the
documents. For any incomplete submission or invalid material, the staff will document the records,
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reject, and inform the households the reasons before having them submitted again. Meanwhile, if
there is any significant difference in earning between two adjacent months, the staff will also ask
the households and document the reasons. All the staff who participated in the program were
enrolled in a brief training session one month prior to the implementation.
Review - An inspection team with several members from the research center and student work-
ers will be verifying the submitted materials during the reviewing stage. For employees who are
hired by formal companies and organizations, the inspection team will contact and inquire about
their employment status and wage earnings for that particular month. For those who are hired by
individuals or performing part-time jobs, the inspection team will contact their employers to verify
hours worked and payments. Most inquiries were made by phone calls. The rest was done by
field investigations. For individuals who perform farming activities or own small businesses, the
inspection team will ask the nearby households to verify business hours first. Then, randomly visit
the households two or three times per month (no less than one hour per visit) to see how well the
business is going. Specifically, the team will observe the type of business the household is doing,
the cost and the revenue, etc. By comparing with other households that are also performing similar
activities, the team will be able to find out a reasonable range of income. For activities such as
rickshaw taxi that does not have a fixed operating location, the team will visit the workers multiple
times to inquire its working hours and income to speculate the range.
Approval - When the inspection team completed the work, the review committee will make the
final approvals of the applications. The review committee includes the community committee and
the inspection team. The final decisions will be made based on several aspects, including the staffs’
impressions on households’ living standards, any unqualified material, reports from the inspection
team. Based on the validity and authenticity of the materials, the final decision is made. All the
decisions are well documented, along with the reasons for rejections.
Distributing the reward - The review committee will submit the final decisions to the research
team with all the supporting materials, reports, and documented records. Then, the team will dis-
tribute the reward according to the submitted decisions within the first two weeks of each month.
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The distributions were accomplished by bank transfers through household heads’ accounts in co-
operation with Leshan City Commercial Bank. Then, the research team will compile a register that
records households and corresponding rewards for that month and submit to the local authority.
For rejected applications, the team will contact the household to inquire about the reasons before
taking further actions.
Penalties for noncompliance - There are incentives for the households to manipulate their
earning to get more rewards. For example, households within the phase-out stage have incentives
to under-report the earnings. Households within the phase-in stage have incentives to over-report
the earnings. The households also have the incentives to over-report family sizes. In the case of
intentional misreporting, a set of rules were made to prevent the households from doing so. Each
rule describes a certain condition that will result in households being expelled from the program.
The review committee also reserves the right to withdraw the rewards that were given previously.
Namely, households are not allowed to intentionally misreport earning, provide any invalid or
forged materials, leak information to irrelevant personnel, obstruct implementation, gamble, par-
ticipate or purchase any goods or service that are not appropriate for aided families, purchase
commercial real estate, refuse to get employed without appropriate reason, conceal changes in
family size, obstruct inspection team from making inquiries, or any form of cheating.
Integrity citation - Households that continuously submit valid and authentic materials through-
out the year will be awarded integrity citations annually. In addition, the awarded households will
be receiving a small amount of bonus issued by the research center.
Household surveys - In addition to the reward applications, the research team will conduct and
carry out household surveys among all households that participated in the experiment once every
two months. The surveys cover a variety of information such as demographics, employment, labor
supply, income, asset, daily expenditures, disease, and healthcare expenditures. Households are
required to respond to the questions based on the knowledge of the last month.
Information sessions - Households in the treatment group were asked to enroll an information
session to familiarize the reward mechanism before the experiment began. The sessions include an
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explanation to inform the households about their rights and responsibilities, particularly the confi-
dentiality of the experiment and underlying consequences. Then, the reward plans were explained
to households, emphasizing that the total amount of reward will increase as they work more. An
illustration of the reward application procedure was also introduced to households. Particularly,
it emphasizes the importance of filing the actual earning. The last section involves explaining the
notion of family size to the households, informing households about the conditions under which a















I, ___________________________, hereby declare my commitment to take part in Wutongqiao Labor Income 
Reward Plan. During the experiment, my household members and I promise:  
 
1. Full cooperation with the government officials to complete the relevant work involved in Wutongqiao 
Labor Income Reward Plan; 
2. Fully comply with the relevant laws and provisions; 
3. Take no extreme measures or disturb public order in the case of being expelled from the program due to 
provision violations; 
4. Provide household information and proof of income as required. 
5. Cooperate with authorized personnel to verify household income and income sources; 
6. Guarantee the authenticity and validity of the information that is provided and will NOT provide any false 
information; and 
7. Will not use the reward received from the program to carry out illegal activities such as gambling, drug 













Name (Print): ______________________ Signature: ______________________ 
ID: ______________________ Date: ______________________ 






Labor Income Reward Plan 






Name:  Telephone:  
Family Size:  Address:  
Income Sources:   
1. Work away from home:  
2. Rickshaw taxi:  
3. Domestic service:  
4. Grocery store:  
5. Farming product:  
6. Others:  
 Monthly Total:  
Date: _______________________________ Community Staff Signature: ____________________ 
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Household Head:  Gender:  Date of Birth:  
ID No.:  Welfare Type:  Minimum Subsistence 
 Registered Poor Household 
Account No.:  Bank:  
County:  Township:  Village:  
Address:  
Household Register:  Urban       Rural 
Phone:  Family Size:  Attachment(s):  
Earning Proof:  Work Type:  Employed 
 Farming (Animal) 
 Others 
 Self-employed 
 Farming (Crop) 
 
Earning:  Reward:   









    Operator: _________  Inspector: _______   (Official Seal) 












    Operator: _________  Inspector: _______   (Official Seal) 
    Telephone (Office): ____________________   Date: 
 
113
PEOPLE’S GOVERNMENT OF WUTONGQIAO DISTRICT 
 





People’s Government of Wutongqiao District 





Mr. (Mrs.) _________________ has been selected to take part in the Wutongqiao Labor Income 
Reward Plan Experiment conducted by Southwest University of Finance and Economics and 
the Wutongqiao Government. The participation of the experiment requires the participants to 
have their monthly earning verified. Please fill out the relevant documents and provide actual 
work information for this person.  
 
Thank you for your cooperation! 
 
Sincerely, 







Wutongqiao Labor Income Reward Plan Experiment 








hereby prove that Mr. (Mrs.) _______________________ is the (1. full-time; 2. contract; 3. Part-
time) employee. This employee worked ___ days in the last month with ___ hours every day. The 
base wage for this employee in the last month was _________ RMB; The bonus was _________ 
RMB; The total earning from the work in the last month was _________ RMB. 
 
The employer confirms that the information above is authentic and valid. 
Please call _______________________ (Phone) or go to _______________________ (Address) 











Wutongqiao Labor Income Reward Plan Experiment 
Daily Sales Record 
 
Date: SID: Household Head: 
Item Cost Quantity Price Revenue 
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
Total     
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Wutongqiao Labor Income Reward Plan Experiment 
Monthly Sales Record 
 
Household Head: SID: 
Item Cost Quantity Stock Revenue 
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
Total Cost: Total Revenue: 
Net Profit: 
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SID:   Community:   Date:   
Household Head:   Gender:   Contact: 
Address: 
Household Member Information: 
  Head 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Name:               
Relationship with 
the Head: 
              
Able-bodied:               
Employment:               
Employer:               
Employer's Address:               
Days Worked 
Per Month: 
              
Hours Worked Per 
Day: 
              
Earning:               
Wage:               
Pension:               
Welfare:               
Others:               
Average Business Revenue:   Family Size:   




Income Per Capita: 
  Average Income Per 
Capita: 
  
Note:   Commitment I confirm that all the 
information above is 
authentic and valid. I am 
aware and willing to take 
responsibility for any 
form of falsification. 
Surveyors and Verification Only 
Community Staff Check and 
Note: 
  Community Staff Signature:   
CHFS Approval: CHFS confirms this family's actual revenue from business is _________, 






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 3
B.1 Figures
Figure B.1: Cumulative Density Function of Changes in Household Expenditures (A)
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Figure B.2: Cumulative Density Function of Changes in Household Expenditures (B)
Figure B.3: Cumulative Density Function of Changes in Household Expenditures (C)
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B.2 Tables
Table B.1: Labor Income Reward Plan (Mabian)
Component Reward Distribution
Price Subsidies
Chicken/Duck/Goose 8% of Revenue Quarterly
Cow 6% of Revenue Quarterly
Goat 10% of Revenue Quarterly
Pig 8% of Revenue Semi-annually
Honey 50 RMB per box Annually
Tea 8% of Revenue Quarterly
Yam 8% of Revenue Quarterly
EITC 6% of Earning Quarterly
Table B.2: Labor Income Reward Plan (Muchuan)
Component Reward Distribution
Kick-starter Subsidy 50% of Cost Quarterly
Price Subsidy
Chicken/Duck/Goose 10% of Revenue Quarterly
Goat 10% of Revenue Quarterly
Pig 10% of Revenue Semi-annually
Tea 10% of Revenue Quarterly
Bamboo Shoots 10% of Revenue Quarterly
Pum 10% of Revenue Quarterly
Turmeric 10% of Revenue Annually
Kiwi Fruit 10% of Revenue Annually
EITC 10% of Earning Quarterly
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Table B.3: Balance of Covariate (Mabian/Muchuan, Show vs. No-show)
All No-show Others N-O p-value
Wage Income 1,993 1,228 2,224 -995 0.003
(4,811) (3,515) (5,119) (334)
Total Income 14,254 11,079 15,217 -4,138 0.003
(20,501) (17,783) (21,172) (1,425)
Total Expenditure 10,759 11,222 10,619 603 0.384
(9,925) (10,230) (330) (692)
Total Hours Worked 2,216 1,837 2,331 -493 0.015
(2,902) (2,854) (2,908) (202)
# of Earners 2.25 2.16 2.27 0.11 0.189
(1.16) (1.06) (1.19) (0.08)
# of Jobs 1.36 1.15 1.43 -0.28 0.007
(1.47) (1.41) (1.48) (0.10)
Poor Housholds 0.37 0.29 0.40 -0.11 0.001
(0.48) (0.45) (0.49) (0.03)
Treatment Village 0.52 0.45 0.54 -0.09 0.013
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.03)
Family Size 4.26 4.34 4.23 0.10 0.414
(1.82) (1.86) (1.81) (0.13)
# of Females 2.03 2.09 2.01 0.08 0.382
(1.30) (1.36) (1.28) (0.09)
Minority 0.56 0.72 0.52 0.20 0.000
(0.50) (0.45) (0.50) (0.03)
Secondary Education 0.69 0.72 0.68 0.04 0.240
(0.46) (0.45) (0.47) (0.03)
# of Able-bodied 2.66 2.52 2.71 -0.18 0.026
(1.18) (1.08) (1.21) (0.08)
# of Children 0.62 0.66 0.61 0.05 0.148
(0.48) (0.47) (0.49) (0.03)
# of Seniors 0.33 0.29 0.34 -0.04 0.170
(0.47) (0.46) (0.47) (0.03)
Receive Pension 0.22 0.16 0.24 -0.08 0.008
(0.41) (0.37) (0.43) (0.03)
Sample Size 1151 268 883
Table presents the balance of covariates of the households that answered both surveys and other households. The first three columns
present the means and the standard deviations (in parentheses) for the whole sample, households that did not show up in the follow-up
survey, and the rest. The fourth column presents the mean difference between the last two groups. The fifth column presents the p-values
of two-sample t-tests. All covariates are aggregated to the household-level. Wage income only includes earnings from employment and
self-employment. “Minority” is an indicator that equals one if there is at least one household member who is a minority. “Secondary
education” is an indicator that equals one if the household has at least one member who has education higher than junior high. “Able-
bodied” is defined as anyone who is between 16 and 65 years old and except for individuals who have completely lost their abilities to
work. “Receive pension” is an indicator that equals one if the household has at least one pensioner. The statistics in this table imply that
there is a statistical difference between households that did not show up in the follow-up survey and households that responded to both of
the surveys.
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Table B.4: Balance of Covariate (Mabian/Muchuan, Treatment Villages vs. Control Villages)
All Treatment Control T-C p-value
Wage Income 1,993 1,992 2,079 -167 0.555
(4,811) (4,832) (4,791) (283)
Total Income 8,691 9,446 7,881 1,565 0.049
(13,982) (13,982) (12,897) (794)
Total Expenditure 15,413 16,386 14,368 2,018 0.000
(10,195) (10,708) (9,514) (598)
Total Hours Worked 2,216 2,184 2,250 -65 0.701
(2,902) (3,072) (2,711) (171)
# of Earners 2.25 2.26 2.23 0.03 0.705
(1.16) (1.28) (1.03) (0.07)
# of Jobs 1.36 1.23 1.51 -0.28 0.001
(1.47) (1.51) (1.41) (0.09)
Family Size 4.26 4.20 4.32 -0.12 0.260
(1.82) (1.82) (1.81) (0.11)
# of Females 2.03 2.01 2.05 -0.04 0.584
(1.30) (1.32) (1.28) (0.08)
Minority 0.56 0.60 0.52 0.08 0.006
(0.50) (0.49) (0.50) (0.03)
Secondary Education 0.69 0.66 0.71 -0.05 0.084
(0.46) (0.47) (0.45) (0.03)
# of Able-bodied 2.66 2.67 2.66 0.01 0.866
(1.18) (1.23) (1.13) (0.07)
# of Children 0.62 0.6 0.64 -0.04 0.170
(0.48) (0.49) (0.48) (0.03)
# of Seniors 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.00 0.975
(0.47) (0.47) (0.47) (0.03)
Receive Pension 0.22 0.21 0.23 -0.02 0.434
(0.41) (0.41) (0.42) (0.02)
Sample Size 1,151 596 555
Table presents the balance of covariates of households that are in the treatment villages and the control villages. The first three columns
present the means and the standard deviations (in parentheses) for the whole sample, treatment-village households, and control-village
households. The fourth column presents the mean difference between the last two groups. The fifth column presents the p-values of
two-sample t-tests. All covariates are aggregated to the household-level. Wage income only includes earnings from employment and
self-employment. “Minority” is an indicator that equals one if there is at least one household member who is a minority. “Secondary
education” is an indicator that equals one if the household has at least one member who has education higher than junior high. “Able-
bodied” is defined as anyone who is between 16 and 65 years old and except for individuals who have completely lost their abilities to
work. “Receive pension” is an indicator that equals one if the household has at least one pensioner. The statistics in this table implies that
there is a statistical difference between treatment-village households and control-village households prior to the intervention.
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Table B.5: Matching Results (Mabian/Muchuan)
Match Treatment Control p-value
Wage Income Before 2,761 4,373 0.009
After 2,761 2,544 0.792
Total Earning Before 3,165 4,812 0.008
After 3,165 2,864 0.618
Total Hours Worked Before 1,650 2,534 0.000
After 1,650 1,505 0.564
# of Earners Before 2.08 2.32 0.011
After 2.08 2.09 0.905
# of Jobs Before 0.93 1.57 0.000
After 0.93 0.97 0.756
Family Size Before 4.04 4.28 0.091
After 4.04 4.18 0.442
Grow Food-crop Before 0.66 0.75 0.006
After 0.66 0.64 0.678
Grow Cash-crop Before 0.26 0.31 0.213
After 0.26 0.27 0.824
Forestry Before 0.12 0.25 0.000
After 0.12 0.11 0.759
Husbandary Before 0.42 0.46 0.270
After 0.42 0.42 1.000
# of Females Before 1.96 2.02 0.572
After 1.96 1.97 0.939
Minority Before 0.54 0.50 0.388
After 0.54 0.52 0.766
Secondary Education Before 0.59 0.70 0.004
After 0.59 0.59 1.000
# of Able-bodied Before 2.59 2.74 0.121
After 2.59 2.63 0.750
# of Children Before 0.56 0.62 0.096
After 0.56 0.57 0.764
# of Seniors Before 0.38 0.32 0.128
After 0.38 0.41 0.544
Sample Size 203 608
Rubins’ B=25.0; Rubins’ R=1.03
Table presents the results of Propensity-score matching. The second and the third column present the variable means of the eligible
households and other households. The last column presents the p-values of the two-sample tests between the last two groups. Each
variable has two rows that compare the means before and after the matching. Results show that the covariates are balanced after the
matching.
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Table B.6: Matching Results (Mabian/Muchuan, Individuals)
Match Treatment Control p-value
Wage Income Before 639 1,088 0.000
After 639 832 0.171
Is Working Before 0.49 0.50 0.635
After 0.49 0.51 0.585
# of Jobs Before 0.21 0.35 0.000
After 0.21 0.21 1.000
Not Working b/c Temporal Reasons Before 0.06 0.02 0.000
After 0.06 0.05 0.528
Not Working b/c Retirement Before 0.02 0.01 0.087
After 0.02 0.02 0.627
Total Months Worked Before 2.00 2.98 0.000
After 2.00 2.07 0.752
Total Days Worked Before 47 70 0.000
After 47 48 0.835
Total Hours Worked Before 388 564 0.000
After 388 396 0.854
Hours Worked per Day Before 13 11 0.000
After 13 13 0.931
Days Worked per Month Before 4.70 7.46 0.000
After 4.70 4.73 0.945
Female Before 0.46 0.44 0.206
After 0.46 0.46 0.960
Age Before 33 31 0.036
After 33 33 0.733
Able to Work Before 0.61 0.59 0.297
After 0.61 0.60 0.647
Secondary Education Before 0.28 0.32 0.020
After 0.28 0.29 0.784
Minority Before 0.59 0.57 0.247
After 0.59 0.61 0.476
Number of Females Before 2.34 2.43 0.095
After 2.34 2.42 0.219
Secondary Education (household) Before 0.73 0.81 0.000
After 0.73 0.76 0.330
# of Able-bodied Before 2.84 3.02 0.000
After 2.84 2.81 0.599
Has Children in the Household Before 0.70 0.75 0.010
After 0.70 0.73 0.293
Has Seniors in the Household Before 0.38 0.31 0.000
After 0.38 0.41 0.335
Family Size Before 4.70 4.97 0.000
After 4.70 4.77 0.365
Sample Size 809 2,816
Rubins’ B=16.7; Rubins’ R=0.97
Table presents the results of Propensity-score matching for individual-level regressions. The second and the third column present the
variable means of the eligible individuals and other individuals. The last column presents the p-values of the two-sample tests between
the two groups. Each variable has two rows that compare the means before and after the matching. Results show that the covariates are
balanced after the matching.
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Table B.7: Matching Results (Mabian/Muchuan, Household Expenditure)
Match Treatment Control p-value
Food Before 645 643 0.954
After 645 640 0.917
Food (Self-supplied) Before 1828 2107 0.093
After 1828 1931 0.600
Education Before 6532 6050 0.293
After 6532 6519 0.981
Ultilities Before 75 87 0.046
After 75 77 0.760
Sundries Before 83 82 0.884
After 83 79 0.576
Clothing Before 1122 1384 0.007
After 1122 1171 0.644
Transportation Before 189 208 0.239
After 189 194 0.784
Communication Before 127 145 0.041
After 127 114 0.200
Minority Before 0.54 0.50 0.388
After 0.54 0.56 0.619
# of Females Before 1.96 2.02 0.572
After 1.96 2.13 0.205
Secondary Education Before 0.59 0.70 0.004
After 0.59 0.65 0.308
# of Able-bodied Before 2.59 2.74 0.121
After 2.59 2.59 1.000
Has Children Before 0.56 0.62 0.096
After 0.56 0.62 0.190
Has Seniors Before 0.38 0.32 0.128
After 0.38 0.38 0.919
Family Size Before 4.04 4.28 0.091
After 4.04 4.15 0.544
Sample Size 203 680
Rubins’ B=29.4; Rubins’ R=1.30
Table presents the results of Propensity-score matching for household expenditure regressions. The second and the third column present
the variable means of the eligible households and other households. The last column presents the p-values of the two-sample tests between
the two groups. Each variable has two rows that compare the means before and after the matching. Results show that the covariates are
balanced after the matching.
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Table B.8: Treatment Effects on Production Type
PSM PSM-DD DD DDD
Crop Only 0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.12*
Husbandry Only 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -0.01
Crop & Husbandry 0.02 0.07 0.04 0.18**
Product Diversity 0.04 0.07** 0.05** 0.02
Food-crop 0.02 0.10** 0.10*** 0.12*
Cash-crop 0.00 0.03 -0.03 0.11
Forestry 0.05 0.15** 0.10*** 0.10
Husbandry 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.17**
Crop Yield (Food + Cash) -365 216 351* 156
Crop Profit (Food + Cash) 35 35 360*** -78
Husbandry Yield 104 104 -541*** 94
Husbandry Profit -186 -186 -221** 294
Farm Yield (Crop + Husbandry) -186 279 -184 7.38
Farm Profit (Crop + Husbandry) -141 -177 351* 156
Controls Yes Yes
Village FE Yes Yes
Sample Size 883 883 1,151 1,151
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table presents the treatment effects on production type. The first three outcomes in the table are indicators that identify whether a
household engages in crop farming only, husbandry only, or both. The fourth row is an indicator that equals one if a household produces
more than one type of farm product. The last four rows are indicators that equal to one if a household engages in food-crop farming,
cash-crop farming, forestry, or husbandry. Food-crop is defined as farm products that are grown for food consumption. Cash-crop is
defined as farm products that are grown for their economic values. Yield is the reported market value of the farm products. Profit is
the market sales revenue less the cost of the input. The result indicates no significant impact on household production. There is some
evidence that suggests that program participation increases households’ engagements in food-crop farming, forestry, and husbandry. In
addition, households tend to diversify their farming products. However, these findings are inconsistent across regressions in terms of
either magnitudes and significance.
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Table B.9: Treatment Effects on Employment and Earning (Individual-level)
PSM PSM-DD DD DDD
Wage Income 1,115** 1,216*** 1,217*** 558**
Is Working 0.04 0.02 0.00 -0.04***
# of Jobs 0.04 0.08* 0.11*** 0.06**
Employed Jobs 0.04** 0.00 -0.01 -0.00
Self-employed Jobs 0.02 0.04 0.00 -0.00
Not Working b/c Temporal Reasons 0.00 0.00 -0.01* 0.01*
Not Working b/c Retired 0.00 0.00* 0.00 0.00
Not Working b/c Housework 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Total Months Worked 0.47 0.62* 0.92*** 0.50**
Total Days Worked 15 18* 22*** 9
Total Hours Worked 178* 179* 271*** 157***
Hours Worked per Day 0.35 0.01 -0.46*** -0.53**
Days Worked per Month 1.29* 1.87** 2.63*** 1.36***
Controls Yes Yes
Village FE Yes Yes
Sample Size 3,625 3,625 3,625 3,625
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table presents the treatment effects on individual outcomes. The results indicate that the Labor Income Reward Plan has positive and
significant impacts on individual earning and the number of jobs. The last five rows present the treatment effects on individuals’ labor
supply. Individual labor supply is reflected by five measurements that describe different aspects of the intensive labor supply. All of
the measurements are constructed based on the four questions in the survey. Namely, household members were first asked how many
months they had been working in the past year (2016 or 2017). Then, household members were asked, on average, how many weeks they
had been working per month. Next, household members were asked, on average, how many days they usually work per week. Finally,
household members were asked, on average, how many hours they usually worked per day in the past year. The results indicate that the
Labor Income Reward Plan has positive and significant impacts on total months worked, total hours worked as well as days worked per
month. However, evidence suggests that individuals’ number of hours worked per day has decreased.
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Table B.10: Treatment Effects on Household Expenditure
PSM PSM-DD DD DDD
Total Expenditure 2,329 2,991** 1,743* 719
Food 753 782 1,828*** -614
Self-supplied Food 183 452 144 496
Utilities 40 53 167*** -161
Sundries 124 123 192** -207
Clothing -152 126 175** 30
Transportation -65 -45 525*** -189
Communication -55 -34 278*** -210
Education Expenditure 74 -287 -709** -168
Wedding/Funeral 969 1,355** -951 1,278
Household Out-transfer 382 429 268 -371
Controls Yes Yes
Village FE Yes Yes
Sample Size 883 883 1,151 1,151
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table presents the treatment effects on household expenditure. Household out-transfer is the sum of the amount of cash the household
gave away to other households due to a variety of reasons. Evidence suggests that program participation increases total expenditure.
However, most estimates are inconsistent across regressions in terms of either magnitudes and significance.
131
Table B.11: Distribution Test for Differences in CDFs (Mabian/Muchuan)
Equality FSD(TC) SSD(TC) FSD(CT) SSD(CT)
Food Difference 0.8168 0.0237 0.039 0.8168 22.0441
p-value 0.087 0.959 0.773 0.043 0.005
Self-supplied Food Difference 0.2945 0.2395 0.0967 0.2945 13.247
p-value 0.987 0.771 0.775 0.687 0.428
Utilities Difference 0.5571 0.013 0.013 0.5571 77.849
p-value 0.514 0.995 0.822 0.252 0.046
Sundries Difference 0.4078 0.0632 -0.0021 0.4078 43.2453
p-value 0.848 0.974 0.785 0.487 0.152
Clothing Difference 0.4568 0.0473 0.0129 0.4568 25.6654
p-value 0.714 0.982 0.811 0.374 0.117
Transportation Difference 1.0718 0.0237 0.0843 1.0718 173.6696
p-value 0.022 0.992 0.810 0.012 0.000
Communication Difference 0.6578 0.0912 0.2904 0.6578 107.6578
p-value 0.372 0.938 0.736 0.207 0.034
Education Difference 0.4527 0.4527 66.6211 0.0493 0.148
p-value 0.846 0.471 0.120 0.964 0.823
Wedding/Funeral Difference 1.151 1.151 30.5224 0.0942 0.0811
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.858 0.716
Out-transfer Difference 0.5366 0.5366 28.2499 0.4559 6.169
p-value 0.544 0.271 0.228 0.388 0.561
Total Expenditure Difference 0.5421 0.1079 2.1789 0.5421 183.1275
p-value 0.612 0.948 0.693 0.330 0.065
Table presents the result of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for differences in CDFs of the treatment and the control group. All CDFs
describe the distributions of the changes in certain household expenditures during the intervention period. The first column shows the
differences and the p-values of distribution equality tests. The rest of the columns shows differences and p-values of the first order
stochastic dominance tests and the second order stochastic dominance tests, among which the first two columns present the test results
that indicate whether the treatment group dominants the control group (TC). The next two columns present the test results that indicate
whether the control group dominates the treatment group (CT). Differences and the p-values of Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests are presented
for each test. The results indicate that CDFs of changes in food expenditure, changes in transportation expenditure, and changes in
wedding/funeral expenditure are statistically different. The distribution of changes in food expenditure and the distributions of changes
in transportation expenditure of the control villages dominate the treatment villages in both first and second order. The distribution of
changes in wedding/funeral expenditure of the treatment villages dominates the control villages in both first and second order. This

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































After careful consideration, I hereby wish to participate Labor Income Reward Plan Experiment. During the 
experiment, My household members and I promise: 
 
1. Full cooperation with the government officials to complete the relevant work involved in Labor Income 
Reward Plan; 
2. Fully comply with the relevant laws and provisions; 
3. Take no extreme measures or disturb public order in the case of being expelled from the program due to 
provision violations; 
4. Provide household information and proof of income as required. 
5. Cooperate with authorized personnel to verify household income and income sources; 
6. Guarantee the authenticity and validity of the information that is provided and will NOT provide any false 
information; and 
7. Will not use the reward received from the program to carry out illegal activities such as gambling, drug 





Name (Print): ________________ Signature: ________________ 
ID: ________________ Date: ________________ 
 









PEOPLE’S GOVERNMENT OF MABIAN/MUCHUAN 
 




People’s Government of Mabian/Muchuan 





Mr. (Mrs.) _________________ has been selected to take part in Labor Income Reward Plan. The participation 
of the experiment requires the participants to have their monthly earning verified. Please fill out the relevant 
documents and provide actual work information for this person.  
 
Thank you for your cooperation! 
 
Sincerely, 







Leibo Labor Income Reward Plan Experiment 








hereby prove that Mr. (Mrs.) _______________________ is the (1. full-time; 2. contract; 3. Part-
time) employee. This employee worked ___ days in the last month with ___ hours every day. The 
base wage for this employee in the last month was _________ RMB; The bonus was _________ 
RMB; The total earning from the work in the last month was _________ RMB. 
 
The employer confirms that the information above is authentic and valid. 
Please call _______________________ (Phone) or go to _______________________ (Address) 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ID   
Household 
Type 
Ordinary ; Registered 
Poor ; Minimum 
Income Guarantee  
Account  Bank  
Approval 
Address   
Household Register Urban ; Rural  
Contact   
Family 
Size 
  Attachments   
Proof of Income See the Attachments 
Work 
Type 
Employment ; Business ; 
Husbandry ; Crop ; Other  






   
Operator: _________   Inspector: _______ (Official Seal) 






Operator: _________   Inspector: _______ (Official Seal) 






Minor Revenue Record 
 
 
Date Goods/Services Quantity Price Revenue 
Buyer/Employer 
Name Contact Address 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 




I hereby declare that all the information above is correct and accurate. I am willing to face any legal 
consequences for any forgery activity. 
 
Instructions: This form is only for income part-time jobs or high-frequent transactions that are 








Major Revenue Record 
 
 
Date Goods/Services Quantity Price Revenue 
Buyer/Employer 
Name Contact Address 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 




I hereby declare that all the information above is correct and accurate. I am willing to face any legal 
consequences for any forgery activity. 
 





APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 4
C.1 Figures
Figure C.1: CDFs of Changes in Number of Earners and Number of Jobs
Figure C.2: CDFs of Changes in Total Hours Worked and Wage Income
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Figure C.3: CDFs of Changes in Farm Yield and Farm Profit
C.2 Tables
Table C.1: Distribution Test for Differences in CDFs (Leibo)
Equality FSD(TC) SSD(TC) FSD(CT) SSD(CT)
Farm Profit Difference 0.7467 0.0273 0.0123 0.7467 50.3147
p-value 0.305 0.978 0.832 0.150 0.024
Farm Yield Difference 1.3398 0.3951 -0.0574 1.3398 86.7005
p-value 0.007 0.577 0.924 0.004 0.006
# of Eaners Difference 0.9174 0.0000 -0.0574 0.9174 2.9699
p-value 0.015 0.951 0.892 0.009 0.001
# of Jobs Difference 1.2456 0.0000 -0.0574 1.2456 5.6745
p-value 0.002 0.963 0.900 0.000 0.000
Total Hours Worked Difference 0.9079 0.2352 -0.0574 0.9079 71.0928
p-value 0.138 0.808 0.941 0.072 0.027
Total Wage Income Difference 1.4032 0.0273 -0.0451 1.4032 51.5563
p-value 0.002 0.98 0.907 0.000 0.000
Table presents the result of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for differences in CDFs of treatment and control groups. All CDFs describe the
distributions of the changes in certain outcomes during the intervention period. The first column shows the differences and the p-values
of distribution equality tests. The rest of the columns shows differences and p-values of the first order stochastic dominance tests and the
second order stochastic dominance tests, among which the first two columns present the test results that indicate whether the treatment
group dominants the control group (TC). The next two columns present the test results that indicate whether the control group dominates
the treatment group (CT). Differences and the p-values of Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests are presented for each test. The results indicate that
distributions of changes in farm yield, changes in the number of earners, changes in the number of jobs, changes in total hours worked,
and changes in total wage income are statistically different. Distributions of changes in farm yield, changes in the number of earners,
changes in the number of jobs, changes in total hours worked, and changes in total wage income of the control villages dominate the
treatment villages in both first and second order. These results are both reasonable and consistent, suggesting that the EITC may have
increased labor supply on both extensive and intensive margin as well as wage income.
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Table C.2: Balance of Covariate (Leibo, Show vs. No-show)
All No-show Others N-O p-value
Family Size 4.84 4.71 4.91 -0.20 0.263
(1.73) (1.73) (1.73) (0.18)
# of Females 2.38 2.29 2.43 -0.14 0.311
(1.28) (1.17) (1.34) (0.14)
Secondary Education 0.08 0.10 0.07 0.03 0.220
(0.27) (0.31) (0.25) (0.03)
Minority 0.94 0.95 0.94 0.01 0.633
(0.24) (0.22) (0.24) (0.03)
# of Able-bodied 2.71 2.69 2.73 -0.04 0.778
(1.17) (1.18) (1.16) (0.12)
# of Children 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.00 0.891
(0.42) (0.42) (0.42) (0.05)
# of Seniors 0.25 0.26 0.25 0.01 0.874
(0.44) (0.44) (0.43) (0.05)
Receive Pension 0.14 0.10 0.16 -0.06 0.108
(0.35) (0.31) (0.37) (0.04)
Registered Poor Households 0.64 0.49 0.73 -0.24 0.000
(0.48) (0.50) (0.45) (0.05)
# of Earners 2.35 2.24 2.40 -0.16 0.165
(1.1) (1.17) (1.05) (0.12)
# of Jobs 2.60 2.46 2.68 -0.22 0.129
(1.33) (1.39) (1.30) (0.14)
Total Hours Worked 4,120 4,024 4,171 -147 0.632
(2,875) (3,031) (2,792) (306)
Total Wage 6,868 7,644 6,450 1,194 0.281
(10,385) (11,426) (9,776) (1,104)
Farming 0.86 0.81 0.89 -0.08 0.030
(0.35) (0.39) (0.31) (0.04)
Farm Profit 1,041 1,191 960 231 0.354
(2,340) (2,635) (2,166) (249)
Farm Yield 9,393 9,943 9,096 847 0.423
(9,913) (10,826) (9,393) (1,055)
Total Income 10,757 11,768 10,211 1,557 0.297
(14,011) (15,174) (13,341) (1,490)
Total Expenditure 14,297 15,526 13,634 1,892 0.516
(27,314) (23,509) (29,185) (2,908)
Sample Size 388 181 207
Table presents the balance of covariates of the sample between households that answered both surveys and other households. The first
three columns present the means and the standard deviations (in parentheses) for the whole sample, households that did not show up
in the follow-up survey, and the rest. The fourth column presents the mean difference between the last two groups. The fifth column
presents the p-values of two-sample t-tests. All covariates are aggregated to the household-level. Wage income only includes earnings
from employment and self-employment. “Minority” is an indicator that equals one if there is at least one household member who is a
minority. “Secondary education” is an indicator that equals one if the household has at least one member who has education higher than
junior high. “Able-bodied” is defined as anyone who is between 16 and 65 years old and except for individuals who have completely
lost their abilities to work. “Receive pension” is an indicator that equals one if the household has at least one pensioner. The statistics
in this table imply that there is no statistical difference between households that did not show up in the follow-up survey and households
that responded to both of the surveys except for the proportion of registered poor households and proportion of households that perform
farming.
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Table C.3: Balance of Covariate (Leibo, Treatment Villages vs. Control Villages)
Overall Treatment Control T-C p-value
Total Wage Income 6,869 6,267 7,558 -1,291 0.222
(10,385) (10,164) (10,619) (1,056)
Receive Pension 0.14 0.12 0.17 -0.05 0.120
(0.35) (0.32) (0.38) (0.04)
Total Income 10,757 10,207 11,387 -1,180 0.409
(14,011) (14,330) (13,650) (1,426)
Total Expenditure 14,298 14,365 14,221 144 0.959
(27,314) (19,682) (34,069) (2,783)
Poor Household 0.64 0.52 0.78 -0.26 0.000
(0.48) (0.50) (0.41) (0.05)
# of Earners 2.35 2.27 2.44 -0.17 0.115
(1.10) (1.07) (1.12) (0.11)
# of Jobs 2.60 2.55 2.66 -0.11 0.408
(1.33) (1.37) (1.29) (0.14)
Total Hours Worked 4,120 3,819 4,465 -646 0.027
(2,875) (2,583) (3,148) (291)
Farming 0.86 0.81 0.92 -0.11 0.003
(0.35) (0.39) (0.28) (0.03)
Farm Profit 1,042 1,242 813 429 0.071
(2,340) (2,525) (2,093) (237)
Farm Yield 9,393 9,838 8,884 954 0.345
(9,913) (10,682) (8,955) (1,008)
Family Size 4.84 4.87 4.80 0.07 0.678
(1.73) (1.72) (1.75) (0.18)
# of Female 2.38 2.42 2.35 0.07 0.606
(1.28) (1.27) (1.30) (0.13)
Minority 0.94 1.00 0.87 0.13 0.000
(0.24) (0.00) (0.33) (0.02)
# of Able-bodied 2.71 2.60 2.84 -0.24 0.047
(1.17) (1.15) (1.18) (0.12)
# of Children 0.77 0.80 0.73 0.07 0.148
(0.42) (0.40) (0.44) (0.04)
# of Seniors 0.25 0.24 0.27 -0.03 0.443
(0.44) (0.43) (0.45) (0.04)
Sample Size 388 181 207
Table presents the balance of covariates of households that are in the treatment villages and the control villages. The first three columns
present the means and the standard deviations (in parentheses) for the whole sample, treatment-village households, and control-village
households. The fourth column presents the mean difference between the last two groups. The fifth column presents the p-values of
two-sample t-tests. All covariates are aggregated to the household-level. Wage income only includes earnings from employment and
self-employment. “Minority” is an indicator that equals one if there is at least one household member who is a minority. “Secondary
education” is an indicator that equals one if the household has at least one member who has education higher than junior high. “Able-
bodied” is defined as anyone who is between 16 and 65 years old and except for individuals who have completely lost their abilities to
work. “Receive pension” is an indicator that equals one if the household has at least one pensioner. The statistics in this table implies that
there is a statistical difference between treatment-village households and control-village households prior to the intervention.
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Table C.4: Matching Results (Leibo)
Match Treatment Control p-value
Wage Income Before 6,866 6,215 0.612
After 6,866 5,795 0.457
# of Earners Before 2.27 2.47 0.141
After 2.27 2.24 0.840
# of Jobs Before 2.51 2.77 0.136
After 2.51 2.45 0.738
Total Hours Worked Before 3,668 4,456 0.031
After 3,668 3,883 0.565
Farm Before 0.87 0.89 0.712
After 0.87 0.87 0.926
Farm Yield Before 7,847 9,802 0.113
After 7,847 7,776 0.955
Farm Profit Before 695 1,110 0.144
After 695 666 0.915
Family Size Before 4.65 5.05 0.081
After 4.65 4.66 0.981
Minority Before 0.90 0.95 0.084
After 0.90 0.91 0.834
Secondary Education Before 0.07 0.06 0.654
After 0.07 0.06 0.782
# of Able-bodied Before 2.67 2.75 0.568
After 2.67 2.64 0.882
# of Females Before 2.23 2.54 0.071
After 2.23 2.27 0.838
# of Children Before 0.70 0.80 0.078
After 0.70 0.72 0.796
# of Seniors Before 0.36 0.18 0.002
After 0.36 0.39 0.631
Sample Size 86 150
Rubins’ B=19.6; Rubins’ R=1.17
Table presents the results of Propensity-score matching. The second and the third column present the variable means of the eligible
households and other households. The last column presents the p-values of the two-sample tests between the two groups. Each variable

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































After careful consideration, I hereby wish to participate Labor Income Reward Plan Experiment. During the 
experiment, My household members and I promise: 
 
1. Full cooperation with the government officials to complete the relevant work involved in Labor Income 
Reward Plan; 
2. Fully comply with the relevant laws and provisions; 
3. Take no extreme measures or disturb public order in the case of being expelled from the program due to 
provision violations; 
4. Provide household information and proof of income as required. 
5. Cooperate with authorized personnel to verify household income and income sources; 
6. Guarantee the authenticity and validity of the information that is provided and will NOT provide any false 
information; and 
7. Will not use the reward received from the program to carry out illegal activities such as gambling, drug 





Name (Print): ________________ Signature: ________________ 
ID: ________________ Date: ________________ 
 









PEOPLE’S GOVERNMENT OF LEIBO 
 




People’s Government of Leibo 





Mr. (Mrs.) _________________ has been selected to take part in Labor Income Reward Plan. The participation 
of the experiment requires the participants to have their monthly earning verified. Please fill out the relevant 
documents and provide actual work information for this person.  
 
Thank you for your cooperation! 
 
Sincerely, 







Leibo Labor Income Reward Plan Experiment 








hereby prove that Mr. (Mrs.) _______________________ is the (1. full-time; 2. contract; 3. Part-
time) employee. This employee worked ___ days in the last month with ___ hours every day. The 
base wage for this employee in the last month was _________ RMB; The bonus was _________ 
RMB; The total earning from the work in the last month was _________ RMB. 
 
The employer confirms that the information above is authentic and valid. 
Please call _______________________ (Phone) or go to _______________________ (Address) 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Leibo Labor Income Reward Plan Approval 
 
 




ID   
Household 
Type 
Ordinary ; Registered 
Poor ; Minimum 
Income Guarantee  
Account  Bank  
County  Township Village 
Address   
Household Register Urban ; Rural  
Contact   
Family 
Size 
  Attachments   
Proof of Income See the Attachments 
Work 
Type 
Employment ; Business ; 
Husbandry ; Crop ; Other  
Earning  Reward  
Household 
Approval Name: 







   
Operator: _________ Inspector: _______ (Official Seal) 






Operator: _________ Inspector: _______ (Official Seal) 
Telephone (Office): ____________________   Date: 
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Leibo County Labor Income Reward Plan Proof of Income 
 
Provided __________________________________________(goods/services) for 
Cash ____________________, and transaction ______________________. 
 
Buyer (Signature): ______________________________ 
Buyer’s contact: ________________________________ 
Seller (Signature): ______________________________ 
 
Date and time: ________(Year)/_______(Month)/ _______(Day) __________(Time) 
Instruction: 
1. Time should be in 24-hour scale. For example, 1 pm afternoon should be 13:00. 
2. This form should only be used in case of a buyer cannot provide a receipt. 
Leibo County Labor Income Reward Plan Proof of Income 
 
Provided __________________________________________(goods/services) for 
Cash ____________________, and transaction ______________________. 
 
Buyer (Signature): ______________________________ 
Buyer’s contact: ________________________________ 
Seller (Signature): ______________________________ 
 
Date and time: ________(Year)/_______(Month)/ _______(Day) __________(Time) 
Instruction: 
3. Time should be in 24-hour scale. For example, 1 pm afternoon should be 13:00. 
4. This form should only be used in case of a buyer cannot provide a receipt. 
Leibo County Labor Income Reward Plan Proof of Income 
 
Provided __________________________________________(goods/services) for 
Cash ____________________, and transaction ______________________. 
 
Buyer (Signature): ______________________________ 
Buyer’s contact: ________________________________ 
Seller (Signature): ______________________________ 
 
Date and time: ________(Year)/_______(Month)/ _______(Day) __________(Time) 
Instruction: 
5. Time should be in 24-hour scale. For example, 1 pm afternoon should be 13:00. 
6. This form should only be used in case of a buyer cannot provide a receipt. 
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